Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus Darrell Wickware,

Defendant—Appellant. ______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:22-CR-27-1 ______________________________ Before Stewart, Clement, and Willett, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: This case concerns the effect of an intervening amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines on the sentence of Darrell Wickware. For the reasons provided below, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court. I In 2017, Darrell Wickware was convicted of robbery under Texas law, a felony offense, and ultimately sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. In May 2021, Wickware was found with a 9-millimeter caliber pistol and charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. In January No. 24-10519

2022, Wickware was indicted for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2)—possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. He pleaded guilty. In June 2024, Wickware appeared for his sentencing hearing. The court addressed his objection and argument that his earlier robbery conviction under the Texas Penal Code did not qualify as “a crime of violence” under the amended Sentencing Guidelines. The court noted that: (1) the Fifth Circuit characterized “robbery” under Texas law as generic robbery and a crime of violence, and (2) Wickware argued that said characterization was no longer good law in light of amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines that “might have” changed the law so that “‘reckless conduct’ under Texas law is no longer covered by . . . generic robbery[.]”The district court ultimately ruled that it was “still bound by Fifth Circuit precedent” and sentenced Wickware to 24 months’ imprisonment. He timely appealed. II On appeal, Wickware asks us to evaluate a recent Guidelines amendment’s effect on our precedent and its potential application to his sentence. Wickware does not dispute the fact of his robbery conviction, only its characterization as a crime of violence under the Guidelines. We review this characterization de novo. United States v. Calderon-Pena, 383 F.3d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Reyes-Contreras, 910 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2018). A Wickware first contends that the district court erred in finding his argument was foreclosed by circuit precedent. Not so.

2 No. 24-10519

The Texas Penal Code defines “robbery” as “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury to another” or “intentionally or knowingly threaten[ing] or plac[ing] another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death” “in the course of committing theft.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02(a)(1)–(2). In United States v. Santiesteban-Hernandez, a 2006 opinion, we held that although § 29.02 “focuses on the realization of the immediate danger through actual or threatened bodily injury, the difference is not enough to remove the Texas statute from the family of offenses commonly known as ‘robbery’” under the Guidelines. 469 F.3d 376, 381 (5th Cir. 2006), abrogated by United States v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc). The Texas statute and the generic offense “substantially correspond[ed]” because “they both involve[d],” as elements of the offense, “theft and immediate danger to a person.” Id. About fifteen years later, we affirmed our Santiesteban-Hernandez holding in United States v. Adair, 16 F.4th 469 (5th Cir. 2021). Specifically, we held that a Texas robbery co