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2024 Supreme(US)(ca5) 374

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Deanda – Appellant
Versus
Becerra – Respondent



United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit

____________ FILED March 12, 2024 No. 23-10159 Lyle W. Cayce ____________ Clerk Alexander R. Deanda, on Behalf of Himself and Others Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus Xavier Becerra, in his official capacity as Secretary of Health and Human Services; Jessica Swafford Marcella, in her official capacity as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Population Affairs; United States of America,

Defendants—Appellants. ______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 2:20-CV-92 ______________________________ Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Haynes and Duncan, Circuit Judges. Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge: Introduction Since 1970, the federal Title X program has given clinics hundreds of millions of dollars in grants to distribute contraceptives and other family planning services. By statute, Title X grantees must serve “adolescents” Case: 23-10159 Document: 117-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/12/2024

No. 23-10159

while also “[t]o the extent practical . . . encourag[ing] family participation.” 42 U.S.C. § 300(a). The question before us is whether Title X preempts a Texas law giving parents the right to consent to their teenagers’ obtaining contraceptives. See Tex. Fam. Code § 151.001(a)(6). We hold that Title X does not preempt Texas’s law. A grantee can comply with both. Moreover, Title X’s goal (encouraging family participation in teens’ receiving family planning services) is not undermined by Texas’s goal (empowering parents to consent to their teen’s receiving contraceptives). To the contrary, the two laws reinforce each other. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment declaring that Title X does not preempt Texas’s parental consent law. In doing so, we agree with the district court that the plaintiff, Alexander Deanda, has standing. If Title X preempts Texas’s law, as the government maintains, it would nullify Deanda’s right to consent to his children’s medical care. That invasion of Deanda’s state-created right alone creates Article III injury. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 342 (2016); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). Because we agree on preemption, we need not reach the district court’s holding that Title X violates Deanda’s constitutional right to direct his children’s upbringing. We depart from the district court on one point, however. Its final judgment partially vacated a regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(b), which forbids Title X grantees from notifying parents or obtaining their consent. The regulation, promulgated after Deanda filed suit, was not challenged by Deanda under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) or otherwise. Nor did the summary judgment order address the regulation’s validity or preemptive force. We therefore conclude that the court erred by vacating the regulation under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) of the APA.

2 Case: 23-10159 Document: 117-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/12/2024

No. 23-10159

Accordingly, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and RENDER. I. Background

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