2025 Supreme(US)(ca6) 30
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Debra Tucker – Appellant
Versus
Comm'r of Soc. Sec. – Respondent
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
┐ DEBRA TUCKER, │ Plaintiff-Appellant, │ > No. 24-5873 │ v. │ │ COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, │ Defendant-Appellee. │ ┘
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at London. No. 6:22-cv-00212—Danny C. Reeves, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: May 7, 2025
Before: CLAY, READLER, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges. _________________
COUNSEL ON BRIEF: Bryan Konoski, KONOSKI & PARTNERS, P.C., New York, New York, for Appellant. Frank D. Tankard, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Baltimore, Maryland, Charles P. Wisdom, Jr., Cheryl Morgan, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.
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OPINION _________________
DAVIS, Circuit Judge. Debra Tucker is a prevailing social security claimant whose attorney appeals the district court’s order awarding reduced attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Tucker’s counsel1 argues that the full requested amount of $31,205.43, which would honor Counsel’s twenty-five percent contingency fee agreement with Tucker, was reasonable for
1While Tucker is the nominal appellant, her counsel is the true party in interest. No. 24-5873 Tucker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Page 2
the services provided. Because the district court acted within its discretion in decreasing the fee, we AFFIRM.
I.
In 2018, Tucker applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–434. After multiple denials at the administrative level, she appealed in federal district court. In 2023, the district court reversed the final administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying Tucker disability benefits and remanded Tucker’s claim for further administrative proceedings after granting the Commissioner’s unopposed motion for remand. Following its decision to remand, the district court awarded Tucker’s attorney $7,500 in attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, along with $402 in costs. This award provided Counsel initial compensation for her 34.8 hours of work on Tucker’s case in the district court, pending a final decision or award. Counsel had a contingency-fee agreement with Tucker for twenty-five percent of any past-due benefits awarded. In August 2024, an administrative law judge found Tucker disabled in a fully favorable decision and granted her monthly disability benefits retroactive to February 2018. Tucker’s past-due benefits totaled $124,821.70.
In September 2024, Counsel moved for the court to award her $31,205.43 in attorney’s fees—twenty-five percent of $124,821.70—under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), less the initial $7,500 EAJA fee award. A twenty-five-percent contingency fee is the maximum percentage allowed under § 406(b). See 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(a). The Commissioner neither supported nor opposed the motion but not