UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ┐ Plaintiff-Appellee, │ │ > No. 21-3753 v. │ │ │ CALVIN CAVER, │ Defendant-Appellant. │ ┘

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland. No. 1:03-cr-00486-4—John R. Adams, District Judge.

Decided and Filed: May 7, 2024

Before: BOGGS, KETHLEDGE, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. _________________

COUNSEL ON BRIEF: Jay R. Carson, Mary E. Dennison, WEGMAN HESSLER VALORE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Adam J. Joines, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. _________________

OPINION _________________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. At the time of Calvin Caver’s sentencing, the federal drug laws subjected Caver to a mandatory term of life imprisonment because he conspired to distribute more than 50 grams of “crack” cocaine and had committed three prior “felony drug offenses.” Later, however, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 increased the amount of crack cocaine required to trigger this life sentence to 280 grams. The First Step Act of 2018 then allowed defendants like Caver to seek retroactive relief “as if” they had committed their crimes No. 21-3753 United States v. Caver Page 2

after the Fair Sentencing Act. Caver sought a reduced sentence under the First Step Act. But the district court held that this Act gave it no discretion to grant him relief. It reasoned that Caver’s jury had found that his drug crime involved at least 500 grams of crack cocaine—an amount that still exceeded the 280 grams required to trigger a mandatory life sentence after the Fair Sentencing Act. We agree and affirm.

I

In the early 2000s, Caver joined a large drug-trafficking conspiracy centered in Cleveland, Ohio. See United States v. Caver, 470 F.3d 220, 228–32 (6th Cir. 2006). The police learned of this conspiracy during an investigation, code named “Operation Snow Removal,” that targeted high-crime neighborhoods in Cleveland. See id. at 228. Their investigation led the United States to indict fifteen coconspirators, including Caver, on several drug charges. See id. at 229. Most defendants pleaded guilty. See id. at 227. Caver did not.

The government ultimately obtained a superseding indictment that charged Caver with three offenses, including a conspiracy to distribute over 50 grams of crack cocaine. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii) (2000); id., § 846. This indictment also included “specifications” alleging other facts. The government added these specifications because the caselaw at the time left much uncertainty over what facts a jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt in order to increase a defendant’s sentence. As relevant here, the indictment specified that Caver’s drug conspiracy involved at least 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine. See Caver, 470 F.3d at 229 n.4.

A jury convicted Caver of all three counts. See id. at 232. But the jury also concluded that Caver’s conspiracy had involved a smaller quantity of drugs than the indictment alleged. It found that