UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

┐ S.C., │ Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, │ │ v. > No. 22-5125 │ │ METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE & │ DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE dba Metropolitan │ Nashville Public Schools, │ Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. │ ┘

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville. No. 3:17-cv-01098—Aleta Arthur Trauger, District Judge.

Argued: July 25, 2023

Decided and Filed: November 15, 2023

Before: MOORE, GIBBONS, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.

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COUNSEL ARGUED: Melissa Roberge, METROPOLITAN DEPARTMENT OF LAW, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Mary A. Parker, PARKER & CROFFORD, Brentwood, Tennessee, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant. Jason Lee, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae. ON BRIEF: Melissa Roberge, J. Brooks Fox, METROPOLITAN DEPARTMENT OF LAW, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Mary A. Parker, Stephen Crofford, PARKER & CROFFORD, Brentwood, Tennessee, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant. Jason Lee, Erin H. Flynn, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae.

GIBBONS, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which MOORE, J., joined. BUSH, J. (pp. 17–22), delivered a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. No. 22-5125 S.C. v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville Page 2

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OPINION _________________

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. S.C., a high school student at the inception of this case, sued the Metro Nashville Public Schools (“MNPS”) under Title IX and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that MNPS was deliberately indifferent to student-on-student harassment that she suffered related to her sexual assault and later participation in a sexual misconduct investigation. In her suit, S.C. raised three types of claims: a Title IX “before” claim, alleging deliberate indifference by MNPS before she was assaulted; a Title IX “after” claim, alleging deliberate indifference by MNPS during the school’s investigation into her harassment; and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

S.C.’s Title IX “before” claim was dismissed at the summary judgment phase, but the remaining claims proceeded to trial. After a bench trial, the court found MNPS liable for emotional distress and other damages on the Title IX “after” claim, but not liable under § 1983. The parties now cross-appeal the judgment, and S.C. also appeals the grant of summary judgment to MNPS on the other Title IX claims.

Because the district court lacked the benefit of our ruling in Doe v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 35 F.4th 459 (6th Cir. 2022), cert. denied sub nom. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. v. Doe, 143 S. Ct. 574 (2023), we vacate and remand the court’s grant of summary judgment to MNPS on the Title IX “before” claim and the § 1983 “before” claim. However, we affirm both the trial court judgment that MNPS is liable on S.C.’s Title IX “after” claim and the damages award.