UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

┐ KATHRYN RODRIGUEZ, │ Plaintiff-Appellant, │ │ Nos. 20-2184/2247/2253 v. > │ │ HIRSHBERG ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION; MODERN │ FINANCIAL SERVICES CORPORATION (20-2253), │ Defendants-Appellees. │ ┘

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids. No. 18-cv-00240—Janet T. Neff, District Judge; No. 20-cv-00877—Hala Y. Jarbou, Chief District Judge.

Argued: November 1, 2022

Decided and Filed: March 14, 2023

Before: McKEAGUE, THAPAR, and READLER, Circuit Judges. _________________

COUNSEL ARGUED: Curtis C. Warner, WARNER LEGAL, Corning, New York, for Appellant. Kathleen H. Klaus, MADDIN HAUSER ROTH & HELLER, P.C., Southfield, Michigan, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Curtis C. Warner, WARNER LEGAL, Corning, New York, for Appellant. Kathleen H. Klaus, Jesse L. Roth, MADDIN HAUSER ROTH & HELLER, P.C., Southfield, Michigan, for Appellees. Nos. 20-2184/2247/2253 Rodriguez v. Hirshberg Acceptance Corp., et al. Page 2

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OPINION _________________

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. District courts, it is broadly accepted, enjoy tremendous freedom in managing their caseload. That flexibility stems in part from the fact that no two district courts are the same. Nor do any two courts employ the same exact practices in overseeing their dockets. Those practices can reflect more art than science, given the unique demands each court faces. But at times, art must yield to science, so to speak. That is the case with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As an overarching goal, the Rules seek to promote procedural uniformity across the federal courts. As a result, the conventions those Rules set out may cede only so much to the whims of a particular district court. Sometimes, a district court can deviate so far from the Rules that its practices amount to an abuse of discretion.

This is such a case. The district court utilized an “administrative closure” to suspend and ultimately dismiss this suit. That practice comes from judicial fiat, not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which articulate different procedures for dispensing with a case. In this instance, the district court’s deployment of local practices is irreconcilable with the requirements set forth in the Rules. Accordingly, we reverse the district court and remand the case for further consideration.

I.

Three in number, these appeals all stem from the same purported violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Kathryn Rodriguez filed suit against Hirshberg Acceptance, a debt collector, alleging that Hirshberg miscalculated the amount she owed on a personal debt in violation of the Act. She likewise claimed that Hirshberg had made the same mistake for all similarly situated debtors. The case proceeded to initial discovery. At that point, both the parties and the district court recognized that a then-pending case in our Court, VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C., 951 F