UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

┐ MATTHEW DICKSON, on behalf of himself and others │ similarly situated, │ Plaintiff-Appellant, > No. 22-3394 │ │ v. │ │ DIRECT ENERGY, LP; TOTAL MARKETING CONCEPTS, │ INC.; SILVERMAN ENTERPRISES, LLC, │ Defendants-Appellees. │ ┘

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Akron. No. 5:18-cv-00182—John R. Adams, District Judge.

Argued: January 17, 2023

Decided and Filed: June 1, 2023

Before: BATCHELDER, STRANCH, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

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COUNSEL ARGUED: Brian K. Murphy, MURRAY MURPHY MOUL + BASIL LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Michael D. Matthews, Jr., MCDOWELL HETHERINGTON LLP, Houston, Texas, for Appellee Direct Energy, LP. ON BRIEF: Brian K. Murphy, Jonathan P. Misny, MURRAY MURPHY MOUL + BASIL LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Michael D. Matthews, Jr., William B. Thomas, Diane S. Wizig, David L. Villarreal, MCDOWELL HETHERINGTON LLP, Houston, Texas, James M. Chambers, MCDOWELL HETHERINGTON LLP, Arlington, Texas, for Appellee Direct Energy, LP. No. 22-3394 Dickson v. Direct Energy, LP, et al. Page 2

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OPINION _________________

DAVIS, Circuit Judge. Matthew Dickson brought this action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, alleging that Direct Energy, LP sent him multiple ringless voicemails (“RVMs”). The district court determined that Dickson received only one RVM and dismissed the suit, finding that Dickson suffered no concrete harm and therefore lacked standing. Dickson now appeals the order dismissing his claim. We conclude that, regardless of the number of RVMs Dickson received, his asserted injury bears a close relationship to one recognized at common law. We further find that Direct Energy caused Dickson precisely the type of harm Congress sought to address through the TCPA. Accordingly, Dickson suffered a concrete injury for purposes of Article III standing. We therefore REVERSE the order of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings.

I

The TCPA is the product of public outrage over abusive telephone marketing practices. Pub. L. 102-243 § 2, ¶ 6 (1991). By the time it was enacted in 1991, companies had begun to use technology that could automatically dial telephone numbers and deliver prerecorded voice messages to potential consumers en masse—reportedly to more than 18 million Americans each day. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3; see also S. Rep. No. 102–178, at 2 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1970 (describing industry developments which expanded the use of robocalls). Many complained that these unsolicited calls tied up phone lines, crowded answering machines, imposed financial burdens, and disrupted public safety services. Pub. L. 102-243 § 2, ¶¶ 5, 9, 14; S. Rep. No. 102–178, at 1–2, as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1968, 1969. Consumers more generally criti