United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit No. 24-2014 DENNIS JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LELAND DUDEK, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:22-cv-01580 — Gabriel A. Fuentes, Magistrate Judge.

ARGUED FEBRUARY 26, 2025 — DECIDED APRIL 21, 2025

Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. This appeal of the denial of Social Security benefits presents a challenging question about how to apply the Social Security Administration’s 2017 revision to the regulatory definition of a “medical opinion.” In particular, we must distinguish between the new regulatory definitions of medical opinion evidence and other medical evidence. The distinction matters, as it determines how an administrative 2 No. 24-2014 law judge must evaluate the evidence in adjudicating a claim for benefits. In the case before us, Dennis Jones contends that an ALJ erred by not treating certain evidence—a statement from a medical examiner—as a medical opinion. We agree with Jones that the medical examiner’s statement was a medical opinion. Ultimately, though, the ALJ was under no obligation to evaluate the statement for its persuasiveness because the medical examiner opined on an issue reserved to the Com- missioner of Social Security. That leaves us to affirm. I A Under the Social Security Act, the Social Security Admin- istration may not award benefits unless a claimant submits “medical and other evidence” of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); see id. § 1382c(a)(3)(H)(i). Not all evidence that a claimant submits receives equal weight. For instance, a claimant’s own statements “as to pain or other symptoms” are not, on their own, “conclusive evidence of disability.” Id. § 423(d)(5)(A); see id. § 1382c(a)(3)(H)(i). Instead, evidence of disability must include “medical signs and findings, estab- lished by medically acceptable” techniques. Id. § 423(d)(5)(A); see id. § 1382c(a)(3)(H)(i). Consistent with those statutory provisions, the Social Se- curity Administration’s regulations have long sorted evi- dence of disability into different categories. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(b), 416.912(b) (2006) (amended 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2015, and 2017). Those categories are significant because they dictate how an ALJ should evaluate the evidence a No. 24-2014 3 claimant submits in support of an application for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c, 404.1527, 416.920c, 416.927 (2017). Before 2017, the regulations distinguished between “[o]bjective medical evidence” and “[o]ther evidence from medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(b)(1), 416.912(b)(1) (2015) (amended 2017). “Objective medical evidence” in- cluded “medical signs and laboratory findings,” while “[o]ther evidence from medical sources” included “medical history, opinions, and statements about treatment.” Id. The subcategory of medical opinion evidence was particularly sig- nificant because the regulations required ALJs to “evaluate every medical opinion.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c) (2012) (amended 2017) (emphasis added). The regulations de- fined a medical opinion to include any “statements from phy- sicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite your impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” Id. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2). Eventually, however, the Social Security Administration be