United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 22-3179 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MILLARD WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 18-cr-00149-1 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED APRIL 16, 2024 — DECIDED JULY 2, 2024 ____________________

Before ST. EVE, JACKSON-AKIWUMI, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Over the phone and while inside a Georgia jail, Millard Williams orchestrated the shipment of a mysterious package to an address in Chicago. Law enforce- ment intercepted the package. It contained furanyl fentanyl, a Schedule I controlled substance. 2 No. 22-3179

A jury later found Williams guilty of (among other things) conspiring to possess and possessing at least 100 grams of furanyl fentanyl. It also determined that furanyl fentanyl is an “analogue of fentanyl,” triggering a ten-year mandatory min- imum sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(vi). This appeal primarily asks us to consider whether furanyl fentanyl is in fact an “analogue of fentanyl” for purposes of § 841(b)(1)(A)(vi)’s penalty provision. Williams says it is not, arguing that we should look to the definition of the term “con- trolled substance analogue” elsewhere in the statute. That definition excludes already-scheduled substances. So, be- cause furanyl fentanyl is a Schedule I substance, he argues, it cannot be an “analogue of fentanyl.” Failing that, Williams as- serts that the district court’s definition of “analogue” renders the provision unconstitutionally vague. We disagree. Briefly, the statute makes clear that a “con- trolled substance analogue” is a term of art quite different from the term “analogue of fentanyl,” so we must instead simply look to the ordinary meaning of the word “analogue.” There is nothing problematically vague about the definition that emerges as applied to furanyl fentanyl. We also reject Williams’s other challenges to his conviction and sentence. While he argues that the district court should have suppressed the evidence found inside the intercepted package, we find there was more than sufficient evidence to supply the reasonable suspicion required to seize it. And as to his procedural challenges to his sentence, we conclude that the district court made no errors requiring resentencing. No. 22-3179 3

I. Background A. Factual Background 1. Intercepted Phone Calls In February 2017, while detained in Georgia on narcotics charges, Millard Williams made a series of phone calls crypti- cally discussing the shipment of a package to Chicago. Home- land Security Investigations intercepted the calls, which we summarize below. The calls began on February 23, with Williams contacting an individual named Willie Alexander. Williams informed Al- exander that he would be receiving two “postcards or two let- ters” in the mail. In more phone conversations over the com- ing days, Williams told Alexander not to “do anything” with the letters without further instruction and warned him not to accept any late-coming mail—“especially from inter–, inter–, inter–, you know what I’m saying?” “It might be a trick,” Wil- liams cautioned, apparently in reference to delayed interna- tional shipments. The mail arrived as Williams promised. On February 28, Alexander reported to Williams that his “thing was at the shop yesterday, the letters.” Williams asked for “the last two digits on that”—apparently referring to the tracking number—to which