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2024 Supreme(US)(ca7) 276

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Christian Arnold – Appellant
Versus
Martin J. O'Malley – Respondent



United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-1305 CHRISTIAN S. ARNOLD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARTIN J. O'MALLEY, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. No. 20-cv-03344 — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 15, 2023 — DECIDED JULY 1, 2024 ____________________

Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and BRENNAN, and LEE, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM. After a remand from the district court, an ad- ministrative law judge (ALJ) with the Social Security Admin- istration determined that Christian Arnold was disabled and entitled to past-due benefits. His law firm, Binder & Binder, then requested attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), point- ing to a contingency fee agreement Arnold had signed. Rather 2 No. 23-1305 than adhering to the agreement, the district court reduced the request by nearly sixty percent, concluding that the full re- quest amounted to a “windfall” to Binder, proscribed by stat- ute. Binder appeals, arguing that the court abused its discre- tion by declining to award its requested fees, which the con- tingency fee agreement prescribed and the statute allowed. We have not had occasion to apply the Supreme Court’s decision in Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002), to deter- mine when and under what circumstances a district court can deviate from contracted-for fees under § 406(b). We take this opportunity to explain how a court should go about this anal- ysis. Here, we conclude that the district court abused its dis- cretion by not anchoring its analysis first and foremost on the contingency agreement before otherwise considering the rea- sonableness of the request. Accordingly, we vacate and re- mand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. Background In April 2018, Arnold retained Binder & Binder (Binder) to pursue a claim for disability insurance benefits before the So- cial Security Administration (the Administration).1 The ALJ concluded that Arnold was not disabled, and the Appeals Council denied his request for review. Arnold decided to ap- peal the agency action in the district court and entered into a new retainer and fee agreement with Binder to represent him.

1 Arnold is the named appellant, but the real party in interest is Binder & Binder, which is challenging the decision to reduce its fees. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 798 n.6. And although the Commissioner lacks a financial stake in this appeal because the fees will be taken from Arnold’s benefits, the Commissioner resembles “a trustee for the claimant[].” See id. No. 23-1305 3

In the district court proceedings, Binder eventually moved for summary judgment. In support of the motion, Binder filed a twenty-three-page brief that outlined Arnold’s medical his- tory and argued that the ALJ had failed to properly evaluate the various medical opinions in the record and Arnold’s sub- jective statements about his symptoms. Rather than filing a response, the Commissioner agreed that remand was appro- priate, and the district court returned the case to the Appeals Council for further proceedings. The court then approved the parties’ proposed motion for fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and awarded Binder $5,694.44. The Appeals Council then remanded the case to the ALJ, who issued a decision in Arnold’s favor in October 2022. In it, the ALJ explained that Arnold was disabled as of December 2016 and

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