United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 22-1576 JOHN DOE, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. THE TRUSTEES OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants-Appellees. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. No. 1:20-cv-02006-JRS-MJD — James R. Sweeney II, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 27, 2022 — DECIDED APRIL 26, 2024 ____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, and WOOD, Circuit Judges. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. While John Doe was a medical student at Indiana University–Purdue University Indianapo- lis, he had a romantic relationship with Jane Roe, a fellow stu- dent, who accused him of physical abuse. The University’s Office of Student Conduct investigated and found Doe culpa- ble. It suspended Doe for one year and imposed conditions on his return to school. The medical school’s Student Promotions 2 No. 22-1576 CommiUee recommended that Doe be expelled. Dean Jay Hess of the medical school rejected the CommiUee’s recom- mendation. So, as of March 2020, Doe was under suspension with a right to return in a year, after satisfying the conditions. Doe then applied to the University’s MBA program at the Kelley School of Business. His application disclosed his sus- pension but described the Dean’s decision as an exoneration. This led to investigation by the University’s Prior Misconduct Review CommiUee, which told Dean Hess that Doe had “withheld pertinent information and gave false or incomplete information” to the business school. Dean Hess concluded, without inviting further response from Doe, that he is unfit to practice medicine and expelled him from the medical school, effective June 16, 2020. That decision led to this litigation, in which Doe accuses the University of violating both the Due Process Clause of the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX of the Ed- ucation Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59743 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2022). All of Doe’s misconduct took place off campus. (We refer to his “misconduct” rather than “alleged misconduct,” be- cause the University found that Doe engaged in physical vio- lence against Roe.) There is some doubt how, if at all, Title IX applies to student-against-student misconduct that appears to be unrelated to a university or its facilities. See Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629, 645–48 (1999). This case does not require us to address whether Title IX required the University to investigate and act, because it did both. Any contest under Title IX to the University’s response depends on proof that it engaged in sex discrimination. 20 U.S.C. No. 22-1576 3 §1681(a). Coming to the wrong answer in deciding who was to blame for unwelcome events in a romantic relationship, or selecting an inappropriate response, or interviewing the wrong potential witnesses, or listening to too few or too many witnesses—these and similar maUers are of no concern under federal law unless the defendants treated men worse than women (or the reverse). And, as the district court explained, the record does not support an inference of sex discrimina- tion. 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59743 at *11–24. After the administrative proceedings began, Doe and Roe were ordered to stay away from each other. For two weeks Doe was told to use the University’s facilities in West Lafa- yeUe, while Roe was allowed to stay in Indianapolis. Doe calls this sex discrimination. The district judge thought not, ob- serving that Doe was the