No. 22-2470 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LINNEL BLOUNT, JR., Defendant-Appellant. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 19 CR 376 — Charles R. Norgle, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 21, 2024 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 26, 2024 ____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, BRENNAN, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. During the COVID-19 pan- demic many federal courts, including the Northern District of Illinois, deferred holding jury trials until it was safe for so many participants (judge, jurors, witnesses, counsel, and oth- ers) to assemble indoors. The court entered a series of orders, all called General Order 20-0012, that suspended criminal jury trials from March 17, 2020, through April 4, 2021 (with a short 2 No. 22-2470 time in between during which jury trials were allowed with restrictions to reflect medical recommendations). Each of these orders stated that health and safety considerations made trials too risky and that any resulting delay should be treated as excludable under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–74. Several versions of this order expressly relied on statements by the Centers for Disease Control and state pub- lic-health officials. Linnel Blount, Jr., was indicted on drug and gun charges in 2019. He demanded a jury trial, which was set for February 4, 2020, but postponed to March 24 at his request. General Or- der 20-0012 prevented the holding of a jury trial on March 24, so the district judge deferred the trial further. Over the next year the judge excluded countable time, in the ends of justice, under 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(7). The judge took General Order 20- 0012 as a given and did not make independent findings. On March 29, 2021, as criminal jury trials were about to resume, the parties filed a joint status report asking for more time to plan. But before a jury trial could be held, Blount waived his jury demand and agreed to a bench trial. It com- menced on July 26, 2021. He was convicted and sentenced to 63 months’ imprisonment. His sole argument on appeal is that the indictment should have been dismissed under the Speedy Trial Act, because the ends-of-justice rulings rested on General Order 20-0012 rather than “individualized” and “case-specific” circumstances. Blount’s immediate problem is that his lawyer never asked the district court to dismiss the indictment. Under 18 U.S.C. §3162(a)(2) such a motion is essential. See, e.g., United States v. Littrice, 666 F.3d 1053, 1059 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Gearhart, 576 F.3d 459, 462 (7th Cir. 2009). Blount’s counsel in No. 22-2470 3 the district court opposed some extensions of time and asked for a speedy trial but did not move to dismiss. Blount’s appel- late lawyer tries to avoid the consequences of that omission by contending that the judge should have read between the lines of Blount’s pro se filings to perceive a motion to dismiss. Yet a between-the-lines approach contradicts the statute. A motion to dismiss is essential, or it is not. Finding such a re- quest implicit in other documents would be equivalent to say- ing that a motion to dismiss is not essential after all. Courts should not insist that unrepresented litigants use technical le- gal language, but that principle does not assist a litigant who has a lawyer yet chooses to bombard the court with pro se fil- ings anyway. What’s more, a district judge is not required to read the pro se filings of a represented defendant at all, let alone read between the lines to find motions never made. A litigant rep- resented by couns