United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 21-1463 DONALD V. SNOWDEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JEREMY HENNING, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. No. 3:19-cv-01322-JPG — J. Phil Gilbert, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 2, 2021 — DECIDED JUNE 27, 2023 ____________________

Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and JACKSON- AKIWUMI, Circuit Judges. SYKES, Chief Judge. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme Court recognized an implied damages remedy against federal officers for certain constitutional violations. Bivens involved a claim for damages against federal narcot- ics agents for alleged Fourth Amendment violations stem- ming from a warrantless search, arrest, and unreasonable 2 No. 21-1463 use of force against the plaintiff in his home. The Court later extended the Bivens remedy to two additional contexts: a claim against a member of Congress under the Fifth Amendment for workplace sex discrimination, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), and a claim against federal prison officials under the Eighth Amendment for failure to provide adequate medical care, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). Since then, however, the Court has consistently refused to authorize new Bivens claims. Today, extending the Bivens cause of action is a “‘disfavored’ judicial activity.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 135 (2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). In recent years, the Court has emphasized that creating new causes of action is the prerogative of Congress, not the federal courts. To guard against encroachments on legisla- tive authority, the Court has fashioned a two-step frame- work for evaluating Bivens claims. The first step considers whether the claim arises in a new context. The context is new if the claim is different in a “meaningful way” from an earlier Bivens claim authorized by the Court. Id. at 139. If the context is not new, then the claim may proceed. But if the context is new, then the analysis proceeds to the second step, which asks whether “special factors” counsel against author- izing a Bivens remedy. Id. at 136. This case requires us to survey the evolving Bivens land- scape. While staying at a hotel, Donald Snowden received a call from the front-desk clerk asking him to visit the lobby to pay for the room. Special Agent Jeremy Henning with the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) awaited Snowden’s arrival; a warrant had been issued for his arrest. According to Snowden, Agent Henning pushed him to the No. 21-1463 3 ground and—unprovoked—punched him several times in the face. Snowden suffered two black eyes and a left orbital fracture. Snowden sued Agent Henning, bringing a Fourth Amendment Bivens claim for use of excessive force during the arrest and a state-law claim for battery. The district judge dismissed the Bivens claim, concluding that it presents a new context and that special factors counseled against extending Bivens here. The judge dismissed the state-law battery claim without prejudice, and Snowden appealed. We resolve this case at step one of the Bivens inquiry. Snowden’s claim does not arise in a new context. While the Supreme Court has strictly limited the reach of Bivens, it has left the door open for at least some claims to proceed— provided, however, that the claim is not meaningfully different from Bivens itself (or one of the other two cases in which the Court recognized an implied remedy). A d