United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 22-3034 MICHAEL J. BOST, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS and BERNADETTE MATTHEWS, in her capacity as the Executive Director of the Illinois State Board of Elections, Defendants-Appellees. APPEAL OF: DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF ILLINOIS Proposed Intervenor. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 22-CV-2754 — John F. Kness, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED APRIL 20, 2023 — DECIDED JULY 27, 2023 ____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Illinois law allows mail-in ballots postmarked on or by Election Day to be counted if received 2 No. 22-3034 up to two weeks after Election Day. The plaintiffs in this case contend that this extended ballot counting violates federal law and filed this suit to enjoin the practice. Within a month, the Democratic Party of Illinois (“DPI”) filed a motion to in- tervene in defense of the law, arguing for either intervention as of right or, in the alternative, permissive intervention. The district court denied DPI’s motion, and this appeal followed. The only question before us on interlocutory appeal is whether the district court erred in denying DPI’s motion to intervene. Because DPI failed to point to any reason that the state’s representation of its interests “may be” inadequate, and because the district court’s focus on public time and re- sources over DPI’s individual interests was not an abuse of its discretion, we affirm. I. Background Federal law establishes “[t]he Tuesday after the 1st Mon- day in November[] in every even numbered year” as “the day for the election.” 2 U.S.C. § 7. State Congressman Michael Bost, and two voters and former presidential electors, Laura Pollastrini and Susan Sweeney (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) con- tend that the Illinois statute allowing the counting of ballots received after Election Day contravenes this federal require- ment. See 10 ILCS § 5/19-8(c). Together, they filed this suit against the Illinois State Board of Elections (“the Board”), which is “responsible for supervising the administration of election laws throughout Illinois,” and Bernadette Matthews, in her official capacity as Executive Director of the Board. DPI became concerned about the impact of this suit on its work as a political organization and on the voting rights of its members. To protect these interests, DPI filed a motion in the No. 22-3034 3 district court to intervene as a defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. In that motion, DPI maintained that it was entitled to intervention as of right or, in the alternative, that the district court should grant it permissive intervention. The district court denied the motion. First, the court found that DPI’s interests were adequately represented by the state’s defense of the statute and therefore denied its motion to inter- vene as of right. It next rejected DPI’s argument for permis- sive intervention, concluding that allowing another party to intervene would divert court time and resources from an al- ready time-sensitive case. Nevertheless, the court allowed DPI to proceed as amicus curiae if it decided to do so. We now affirm, but take this opportunity to clarify again our standards for intervention as of right. II. Analysis “Because denial of a motion to intervene essentially ends the litigation for the movant, suc