United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 21‐1276 LAURA EWING, Plaintiff‐Appellant, v. MED‐1 SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendant‐Appellee. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. No. 1:18‐cv‐01743‐JRS‐DML — James R. Sweeney II, Judge. ____________________ No. 21‐1299 SEPTEMBER WEBSTER, Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v. RECEIVABLES PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT, LLC, Defendant‐Appellee. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. No. 1:18‐cv‐03940‐TWP‐DML — Tanya Walton Pratt, Chief Judge. ____________________ 2 Nos. 21‐1276 & 21‐1299

ARGUED DECEMBER 14, 2021 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 2, 2022 ____________________

Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and ST. EVE, Cir‐ cuit Judges. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. Laura Ewing and September Web‐ ster disputed certain debts they allegedly owed to debt‐col‐ lection companies. Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), debt‐collection companies must report such disputes to credit reporting agencies, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8), but the companies here failed to do so. Ewing and Webster sued separately, seeking actual and statutory damages. See id. § 1692k(a). The companies prevailed at summary judgment because the district courts in both cases determined that the companies’ mistakes were bona fide errors. See id. § 1692k(c). On appeal, both Ewing and Webster argue that the debt collectors’ actions were not bona fide errors. We have consol‐ idated their cases for decision. Before we may reach the mer‐ its, though, we must reexamine the requirements for Article III standing, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s re‐ cent decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021), which clarified what counts as an injury‐in‐fact. I. Background A. Ewing v. MED‐1 Solutions, LLC Laura Ewing sought to dispute medical debts by faxing a letter to MED‐1 Solutions, LLC, a debt‐collection company as‐ signed to her case. MED‐1’s receptionist, however, misrouted the fax, forwarding it to the client‐care department rather than the legal department. According to MED‐1’s fax‐distri‐ bution policy, any faxed legal communication regarding Nos. 21‐1276 & 21‐1299 3 contested debts was to be forwarded to the legal department. That day the receptionist received five additional dispute let‐ ters, which she correctly forwarded to the legal department. But as a result of the misrouted fax, Ewing’s dispute was never recorded. Two years later, Ewing obtained her credit report and saw that her debts, as reported by MED‐1, were not indicated as disputed. After MED‐1 eventually recorded the debts as dis‐ puted, her credit score rose. Ewing sued MED‐1 for violations of the FDCPA. She as‐ serted that MED‐1 reported her debts to a credit reporting agency without noting that the debts were disputed. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8). MED‐1 admitted that it had received Ewing’s dispute letter and failed to report the dispute to the credit reporting agency, and it raised the affirmative defense of bona fide error under § 1692k(c). This provision provides safe harbor for debt collectors when they make an uninten‐ tional error, so long as they maintained procedures reasona‐ bly adapted to avoid it. MED‐1 argued that the bona fide error defense applied because its failure to report the dispute arose from an un