United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ____________________ Nos. 19-2993 & 19-3109 RENETRICE R. PIERRE, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellee/ Cross-Appellant,

v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC., Defendant-Appellant/ Cross-Appellee. ____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 16 C 2895 — Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 9, 2020 — DECIDED APRIL 1, 2022 ____________________

Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and BRENNAN, Circuit Judges. SYKES, Chief Judge. Midland Credit Management, Inc., sent Renetrice Pierre a letter offering to resolve a long- unpaid debt at a discount. The statute of limitations on the debt had run. The letter advised Pierre that because of the 2 Nos. 19-2993 & 19-3109 age of the debt, Midland Credit would neither sue her for it nor report it to a credit agency and that her credit score would be unaffected by either payment or nonpayment. Pierre did not take Midland Credit up on the offer. In- stead, she sued the company alleging that it violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Asking for payment of a time- barred debt isn’t unlawful, but Pierre contended that the collection letter was a deceptive, unfair, and unconscionable method of debt collection, in violation of the Act. She sought to represent a class of Illinois residents who had received similar letters from Midland Credit. The district court certi- fied the class and entered summary judgment in its favor on the merits. A jury awarded statutory damages totaling $350,000. The parties have cross-appealed, raising issues related to standing, class certification, and the merits. We begin and end with standing. The letter might have created a risk that Pierre would suffer a harm, such as paying the time-barred debt. But a risk, at most, is all it was. That’s not enough to establish an Article III injury in a suit for money damages, as the Supreme Court held last year in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2210–11 (2021). Accordingly, we vacate and remand with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. I. Background In 2006 Pierre opened a credit-card account with Target National Bank. She accumulated consumer debt on the account and defaulted on it. Midland Funding, LLC, bought the debt and sued Pierre for it in Illinois state court in 2010. Midland Funding later voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit. Nos. 19-2993 & 19-3109 3

Fast forward to 2015. Midland Credit, which collects debts for Midland Funding, sent Pierre a letter seeking payment of the debt. The letter told Pierre that she had been “pre-approved for a discount program designed to save [her] money.” It listed multiple payment plans—one promis- ing savings of 40%—and said that the offer would expire in 30 days. Because the debt was so old, the statute of limitations had run. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-205. Midland Credit could ask for payment, but it couldn’t sue for it. The letter ended with this: “The law limits how long you can be sued on a debt. Because of the age of your debt, we will not sue you for it, we will not report it to any credit reporting agen- cy, and payment or non-payment of this debt will not affect your credit score.” The letter surprised and confused Pierre. Midland Fund- ing had sued her for the debt and then dropped the case. Now a company with a slightly different nam