United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 21-3265 TERRANCE SHAW, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PAUL KEMPER, et al., Defendants-Appellees. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. No. 21-cv-49 — J.P. Stadtmueller, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 4, 2022 — DECIDED OCTOBER 25, 2022 ____________________

Before SCUDDER, ST. EVE, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judges. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Terrance Shaw, a former Wiscon- sin inmate, is confined to a wheelchair and incontinent. Three times in 2018 he defecated on himself after being unable to access the handicapped toilet within the Racine Correctional Institution. Each time the bathroom was occupied by a non- disabled inmate, and each time Shaw complained about the lack of access, his grievances resulted in nothing changing, 2 No. 21-3265

with the prison staff saying that they could neither reserve re- stroom time nor control the actions of other inmates. Shaw then brought suit alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. But the district court, in screening the complaint, concluded that Shaw failed to state a claim and dismissed the action. Having taken our own look at Shaw’s complaint, we believe that he alleged enough to survive screening and therefore return the case to the dis- trict court for further proceedings. I Shaw’s complaint supplies the operative factual allega- tions, which we accept as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Prepared on a prison typewriter, and without the benefit of counsel, Shaw’s complaint stands out for its clarity and pre- cision. He alleged that three times in 2018 he needed to use the handicapped bathroom but was unable to because non- disabled prisoners occupied it. Each instance ended with Shaw defecating on himself. After the first two incidents, Shaw alerted prison staff, who asserted that they could not control what toilets other inmates used or reserve the handi- capped stall solely for his use. On the third occasion, Shaw sought to find another bathroom by painfully dragging him- self along the ground for about 180 feet before finally giving up and (again) defecating on himself. Shaw’s complaint alleged violations of the ADA, the Re- habilitation Act, and various constitutional rights. Before al- lowing the defendants to be served and fulfilling the screen- ing obligation imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the district court addressed the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims and No. 21-3265 3 concluded that Shaw, while unquestionably a qualified per- son with a disability, failed to allege a denial of access to any prison service and instead complained only about an “incon- venience” of prison life. Shaw appeals, now represented—indeed, well repre- sented—by lawyers from the non-profit organization Rights Behind Bars. II The district court should have permitted Shaw’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims to survive dismissal at screening. A District courts have a duty to screen civil lawsuits from prisoners and to dismiss any complaint that “is frivolous, ma- licious, or fails to state a claim.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). To survive dismissal, a prisoner plaintiff need only plead suffi- cient facts to suggest a plausible claim for relief. See Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Plausibility i