United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 17-2428 PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF INDIANA AND KENTUCKY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. KRISTINA BOX, Commissioner, Indiana State Department of Health, et al., Defendants-Appellants. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. No. 1:17-cv-01636-SEB-DML — Sarah Evans Barker, Judge. ____________________ ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES DECIDED MARCH 12, 2021 ____________________

Before KANNE, ROVNER, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. This appeal returns to us on re- mand from the Supreme Court of the United States. In 2019, we affirmed the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunc- tion against enforcement of a new Indiana statutory re- striction on minors’ access to abortions. See Planned 2 No. 17-2428 Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky, Inc. v. Adams, 258 F. Supp. 3d 929 (S.D. Ind. 2017), aff’d, 937 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 2019), reh’g de- nied, 949 F.3d 997 (7th Cir. 2019). The State defendants peti- tioned for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court granted the petition, vacated our decision, and remanded for further con- sideration in light of June Medical Services LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020), which struck down a Louisiana law regulat- ing abortion providers, but without a single majority opinion. We apply the predominant and most sound approach to the “narrowest ground” rule in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), for assessing the precedential force of Supreme Court decisions issued without a majority opinion. The opin- ions in June Medical show that constitutional standards for state regulations affecting a woman’s right to choose to termi- nate a pregnancy are not stable, but they have not been changed, at least not yet, in a way that would change the out- come here. The Chief Justice’s concurring opinion in June Medical of- fered the narrowest basis for the judgment in that case, giving stare decisis effect to Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016), on the essentially identical facts in June Med- ical. The Marks rule does not, however, turn everything the concurrence said—including its stated reasons for disagree- ing with portions of the plurality opinion—into binding prec- edent that effectively overruled Whole Woman’s Health. That is not how Marks works. It does not allow dicta in a non-major- ity opinion to overrule an otherwise binding precedent. We applied those binding standards from Whole Woman’s Health in our earlier decision, and that decision has not been over- ruled by a majority decision of the Supreme Court. We there- fore again affirm the district court’s preliminary injunction No. 17-2428 3 barring enforcement of the challenged law pending full re- view in the district court. I. Factual and Procedural Background Given the lengthy opinions already issued in this case, we summarize the issues leading up to this point. Indiana’s Sen- ate Enrolled Act 404, enacted in 2017, included amendments to Indiana’s judicial-bypass process. That process, required by Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), creates a narrow legal path for an unemancipated minor to obtain an abortion with- out parental consent. The minor must first find her way to a state trial court. She must then obtain a court order finding either that the abortion would be in her best interests or that she is sufficiently mature to make her own decision. Ind. Code § 16-34-2-4(e). Senate Enrolled Act 404 amended the process in several ways, some of which the distr