United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 17-1055 AYESHA KHAN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. MIDWESTERN UNIVERSITY, an Illinois not-for-profit corporation, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:14-CV-09539 — John Robert Blakey, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 6, 2017 — DECIDED JANUARY 16, 2018 ____________________

Before BAUER, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges. ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Ayesha Khan struggled academi- cally in medical school from the outset. She failed three of her courses in her first year of medical school at The Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine at Midwestern University. Ordinarily, under the school policy, this would permit the school administrators to dismiss her from the program. They opted not to do so. Instead, they gave Khan a second oppor- 2 No. 17-1055 tunity to prove herself able to satisfactorily complete the program. She was able to pass the classes on her second try the following year, but she continued to fail new classes in the second year (Block II) of her medical school curriculum. This time, however, she was pregnant and after being ex- pelled, she sued the University, claiming that it had violated the Rehabilitation Act by failing to accommodate her preg- nancy-related disabilities. The University filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that even if all the facts she al- leged were true, she was not otherwise qualified for the medical school program. I. Because this case comes to us as an appeal of a grant of summary judgment, we take all of the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Khan, and look to see whether given those facts, the motion can be granted as a matter of law. See Aguilar v. Gaston-Camara, 861 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 2017). We must resist the trap of assessing the cred- ibility of witnesses, choosing between competing inferences or balancing the relative weight of conflicting evidence. Or- ton-Bell v. Indiana, 759 F.3d 768, 773 (7th Cir. 2014). Some- times a party makes that task difficult either by lodging speculative claims or engaging in a pattern of behavior that suggests dishonesty. Payne v. Pauley, 337F.3d767, 771 (7th Cir. 2003). Nevertheless we must remain true to our task on summary judgment and take the facts in the light most fa- vorable to Khan. Id.Khan, one of her profes- sors, upon learning of her pregnancy, told her that “preg- nancy is a full time job that required [her] to sit at home and No. 17-1055 3 play mommy.” R. 59-2 at 2, Page ID 496; R. 59-1 at 10, Page ID 477. 1 Even assuming, as we must for purposes of this mo- tion, that the comment was uttered, we must assess whether it has any legal relevance for a candidate who, at the time it occurred, had already failed more courses than permitted for students in the program. In other words, “the plain language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment … against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477U.S.317, 322 (1986). It is Midwestern’s burden to demonstrate that there are no genuine disputes as to any facts that are material to Khan’s discrimination claim. Id.nature of the discrimination, it has no legal relevance if Khan was not otherwise qualified, with or with- out accommodations, for the program. The University all