United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 13-3766

JOHN MICHAEL WOODS, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. CITY OF BERWYN, * Defendant-Appellee. ___________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 12-cv-1900 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 30, 2014 — DECIDED OCTOBER 15, 2015 ____________________

Before KANNE, WILLIAMS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. When John Woods told a co- worker at the Berwyn Fire Department that “he wanted to

* Although the caption originally reflected Ronald Hamilton as an appellee, we have removed him since the only counts in the complaint relating to Hamilton were not part of this appeal. 2 No. 13-3766 kill somebody, all of them” and that his children were going to “go over there” and “tune them up,” referring to his coworkers and superiors, Fire Department Chief Denis O’Halloran looked into the statements and eventually rec- ommended termination. A three-member panel for the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners conducted a hear- ing on O’Halloran’s recommendation. Woods was repre- sented by counsel, who gave opening and closing state- ments, put on witnesses, cross-examined others, made and won objections, and presented exhibits. After the hearing, the Board voted to terminate Woods based largely on the testimony of the co-worker to whom Woods made the statement. Woods filed a complaint in federal court asserting discrimination and unlawful retaliation and attempted to proceed under a cat’s paw theory of liability, which applies in employment discrimination cases when a biased subordi- nate who lacks decision-making power uses the formal deci- sion-maker as a dupe in a deliberate scheme to trigger a dis- criminatory employment action. Under Woods’s theory, O’Halloran was the discriminatory subordinate who used the formal decision-maker (the Board) to fire him. However, based on the full and independent evidentiary hearing and the Board’s almost complete reliance on the co-worker’s tes- timony, any discriminatory animus by O’Halloran cannot be the basis for the cat’s paw liability. Without that, Woods cannot make out a prima facie case, and we affirm the grant of summary judgment. I. BACKGROUND Because we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we present the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Woods, the non-moving party. No. 13-3766 3 Nichols v. Mich. City Plant Planning Dept., 755 F.3d 594, 599 (7th Cir. 2014). Although our decision does not ultimately turn on the events that Woods alleges were discriminatory, we present them to give context to Woods’s case. In January 2010, Berwyn Fire Department Lieutenant John Woods sustained a back injury from carrying a 350- pound heart attack victim. Woods was cleared to return to work in April, but did not return until June because of per- sistent pain. Before Woods’s return, Chief O’Halloran and Assistant Chief Frank Simek sent him two memoranda with instructions to complete the enclosed Family Medical Leave Act paperwork. Simek also visited Woods’s home and reit- erated that the FMLA paperwork needed to be signed be- cause it revolved “around [his] status as a fireman.” Fearing for his job’s safety, Woods signed the FMLA paperwork. Upon Woods’s return, O’Halloran informed Woods that he had three options: he could go on normal retirement, on duty-related disability, or on a nonduty-related disability. Woods said he was not interested in any of the option