United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 22-2118 DYAMOND DAVIS and ANTIONETTE BURNS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. No. 2:18-cv-02246 — Colin S. Bruce, Judge. ____________________

ARGUED APRIL 12, 2023 — DECIDED MAY 14, 2025 ____________________

Before SCUDDER, KIRSCH, and LEE Circuit Judges. LEE, Circuit Judge. On May 12, 2017, Dyamond Davis told her supervisor at the Shapiro Development Center, an as- sisted living facility operated by Defendant Illinois Depart- ment of Human Services (“DHS”), that she had to leave work due to morning sickness caused by her pregnancy. Her super- visor agreed, reminding Davis to complete the necessary timekeeping paperwork. 2 No. 22-2118

Several weeks later, DHS granted Davis’s request for preg- nancy leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (“FMLA”), retroactive to May. Never- theless, it later determined that a portion of her absence on May 12 was unauthorized for two reasons. First, it believed that Davis’s FMLA leave did not cover morning sickness; sec- ond, it concluded that Davis had violated Shapiro’s policies requiring the substitution of accrued paid leave for FMLA leave. And so, DHS terminated Davis’s employment in ac- cordance with its attendance plan. Following an unsuccessful appeal of her termination to the Illinois Civil Service Commission, Davis brought suit, alleg- ing that DHS had interfered with her FMLA-protected rights. Another Shapiro employee, Antionette Burns, joined the com- plaint asserting a substantially similar claim. After discovery, the district court dismissed Burns’s claim for lack of Article III standing and entered summary judgment in favor of DHS on Davis’s claim. Davis v. Ill. Dep’t Hum. Servs., No. 18-CV-2246, 2022 WL 2287938, at *11 (C.D. Ill. May 31, 2022). Davis and Burns appealed. Because we agree that Burns has failed to establish a con- crete injury-in-fact, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of her claim without prejudice. But because we find that dis- putes of material fact exist as to Davis’s FMLA claim against DHS, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judg- ment as to her claim and remand for further proceedings. I. A. The FMLA and Pregnancy A review of the applicable law will provide a helpful framework for the facts in this case. Under the FMLA, eligible No. 22-2118 3 employees are entitled to twelve workweeks of leave during any twelve-month period due to a “serious health condition” that renders them “unable to perform the functions of [their] position.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). A “serious health condi- tion” is one that involves “continuing treatment by a health care provider” and includes any period of incapacity due to pregnancy or prenatal care. Id. § 2611(11)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(b). Moreover, absences attributable to pregnancy- related illnesses, such as severe morning sickness, qualify for FMLA leave even if the employee does not visit the doctor during the absence. 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(f); see id. § 825.120(a)(4). In short, the FMLA applies to both pregnancy and pregnancy-induced morning sickness. Although pregnant employees are entitled to FMLA leave for morning sickness, that right is not absolute. Employers have the right to require that their employees provide a med- ical certification to justify the need for leave due to any serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a