Nos. 03-2345 & 03-2915 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLARENCE HANKTON and GREGORY DAVIS, Defendants-Appellants. ____________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 01 CR 1—Charles R. Norgle, Sr., Judge. ____________ SUBMITTED MAY 8, 2006—DECIDED AUGUST 18, 2006 ____________

Before COFFEY, MANION, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. COFFEY, Circuit Judge. In November of 2002, Clarence Hankton and Gregory Davis each pled guilty to possessing, with the intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).1 After conducting a sentencing hearing, during which the government introduced a plethora of evidence concerning the drug and gang activities of both defendants, the district judge sentenced Hankton to a term of 300 months and Davis to 210 months. Both men ap-

1 In the case of Hankton, cocaine base, commonly known as “crack” cocaine. 2 Nos. 03-2345 & 03-2915 pealed, see United States v. Hankton, 432 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2005), and while we affirmed each of their sentences, we remanded their cases to the district court in accordance with United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 481 (7th Cir. 2005). The district judge has replied stating that he would have given Hankton and Davis the same sentences notwith- standing the now-advisory nature of the Guidelines. United States v. Hankton and Davis, No. 01-CR-1 (April 21, 2006); see United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738, 757 (2005). We invited the parties to file arguments concerning the reason- ableness of the sentences, however, only Davis and the government responded. Nevertheless, we affirm both of the defendants-appellants’ sentences as reasonable. See United States v. Newsome, 428 F.3d 685, 686 (7th Cir. 2005); Paladino, 401 F.3d 484. Our review of a district judge’s sentencing determina- tion is deferential, and we will not substitute our judgement for that of the trial judge when dealing with the question of what sentence should have been imposed on the defendant. See United States v. Williams, 425 F.3d 478, 481 (7th Cir. 2005). In addition, a sentence that is within a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. See United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005) An appellant may rebut this presumption of reason- ableness by demonstrating that his sentence would be unreasonable when measured against the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), such as the “need for the sentence imposed—(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” Id. (citing Booker, 543 U.S. at 766). Nos. 03-2345 & 03-2915 3

I. REASONABLENESS OF HANKTON’S SENTENCE As our earlier opinion in this case makes clear, the sentencing judge properly applied the Guidelines when calculating Hankton’s sentence, see Hankton, 432 F.3d at 790-97, and accordingly his sentence as imposed is consid- ered presumptively reasonable. See Hankton, 432 F.3d at 789-97; Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d at 608. Hankton has declined our invitation to explain why and how the district court’s analysis should be considered insufficient to support his sentence or why the sentence he received was unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors. Further, while informing us that he would have given Hankton the same sentence had the Guidelines