No. 23-3575 ___________________________

United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Kira Kristina Zielinski

Defendant - Appellant ____________

Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern ____________

Submitted: September 26, 2024 Filed: February 13, 2025 ____________ Before GRUENDER, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. ____________ GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Kira Zielinski absconded with her minor child to Mexico with the intent of depriving her ex-husband of his parental rights. When Zielinski returned to the United States, she was indicted for international parental kidnapping. See 18 U.S.C. § 1204(a). Following a bench trial, the district court1 found Zielinski guilty and sentenced her to 36 months’ imprisonment. Zielinski appeals, arguing that the district court erroneously prohibited her from introducing evidence that she absconded with her child to protect him from sexual abuse by the father. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Zielinski argues that she was entitled to present evidence of the child’s sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. § 1204(c)(2), which provides an affirmative defense to international parental kidnapping if “the defendant was fleeing an incidence or pattern of domestic violence.” Noting that Zielinski did not contend that she herself was a victim of domestic violence, the district court precluded Zielinski from introducing evidence of the child’s abuse because it found that § 1204(c)(2) only applied if the defendant, not a third party such as Zielinski’s child, suffered domestic violence that prompted the flight to safety. We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of § 1204(c)(2). See United States v. Mink, 9 F.4th 590, 609 (8th Cir. 2021).

Zielinski contends that § 1204(c)(2) encompasses those situations where a third party alone suffers domestic violence and the defendant aids the third party in escaping that violence. 2 But Zielinski’s reading stretches the plain text of the statute. See Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) (“Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the

1 The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. 2 The only court to have considered the issue (besides the district court in this case) concluded that § 1204(c)(2) does not include defense of a third party. See United States v. Malka, 602 F. Supp. 3d 510, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (“[W]hile the [defendants] seem to contend they were ‘rescuing’ the [children] from some kind of alleged abuse, the plain statutory language indicates that the affirmative defense solely applies when ‘the defendant’ himself or herself is ‘fleeing an incidence or pattern of domestic violence’ with the removed child.” (emphasis in original)).

-2- legislative purpose.”). The statute makes no reference to domestic violence against a third party. Section 1204(c)(2) speaks only of the defendant’s flight from domestic violence. 3

If Congress had wanted to include defense of a third party in § 1204(c)(2), it easily could have done so. See Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 597 U.S. 629, 642 (2022) (“The Court may not replace the actual text [of a statute] with speculation as to Congress’ intent.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As the Government points out, Congress could h