No. 22-2286 ___________________________

George Par; IVYR, PLLC, doing business as Par Retina

Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

Wolfe Clinic, P.C.; Jared S. Nielsen; Kyle J. Alliman; David D. Saggau

Defendants - Appellees ____________

Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Central ____________

Submitted: January 10, 2023 Filed: June 5, 2023 ____________ Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. ____________ BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Dr. George J. Par (and IVYR PLLC, doing business as Par Retina) sued Wolfe Clinic, P.C. (and three of its owner-physicians). Par alleged that the Clinic monopolized or attempted to monopolize the vitreoretinal care market. On the merits, the district court 1 initially dismissed the monopolization, fraudulent

1 The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Iowa. inducement, and recission claims, while remanding the remaining state law claims. In an amended judgment, the district court denied Par’s motion to amend the complaint, affirmed the dismissal of the monopolization claims, but declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, dismissing all state law claims. Par appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

I.

Dr. Par, an ophthalmologist, specializes in vitreoretinal surgery. After the Clinic fired him, he founded Par Retina to provide retinal eye care services in Des Moines, Spencer, and Ft. Dodge, Iowa. Believing that the Clinic harmed his business, Par sued for monopolization and attempted monopolization, asserting 12 state law claims.

Wolfe Clinic moved to dismiss the monopolization, attempted monopolization, fraudulent inducement, and recission claims. In May 2022, the district court dismissed the monopolization claims, ruling that Par failed to plead a plausible claim under the Sherman Act because he did not allege an antitrust injury or state a proper geographic market. The district court also dismissed the fraudulent inducement and recission claims on their merits, but remanded the other state law claims. Par then moved to amend his complaint.

A month later, the district court entered an amended judgment, denying Par’s motion and again dismissing the monopolization claims. The district court, however, ruled it could not remand the state law claims. It instead declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any of the state law claims, dismissing all of them. Par argues that the district court erred in dismissing the antitrust, fraudulent inducement, and recission claims on their merits and refusing to grant his post- judgment motion to amend the complaint.

This court “review[s] de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss, accepting as true all factual allegations in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in -2- favor of the non-moving party.” Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir. 2012). “We affirm a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal if ‘it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Double D Spotting Serv. v. Supervalu, Inc., 136 F.3d 554, 557 (8th Cir. 1998), quoting Hafley v. Lohman, 90 F.3d 264, 266 (8th Cir. 1996). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic