SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Article Pause Article
judgment-img

2023 Supreme(US)(ca8) 307

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
United States – Appellant
Versus
Christopher Conrad – Respondent



No. 22-3275 ___________________________

United States of America,

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,

v.

Christopher Joseph Conrad,

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant. ____________

Appeal from United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern ____________

Submitted: June 12, 2023 Filed: July 26, 2023 ____________ Before LOKEN, COLLOTON, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges. ____________ COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Christopher Conrad pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon. See U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). At sentencing, the district court determined a base offense level of 24 after concluding that Conrad had sustained two prior felony convictions for a crime of violence. The court sentenced Conrad to 96 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Conrad argues that the district court committed procedural error when it calculated his base offense level and failed to follow the procedures of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(3). We affirm the sentence, but remand for correction of the court’s statement of reasons.

Conrad first argues that the district court committed procedural error in calculating his base offense level. The guidelines set a base offense level of 24 if “the defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” USSG § 2K2.1(a)(2). The guidelines define “crime of violence” to include “any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that . . . has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Id. § 4B1.2(a)(1). The district court concluded that Conrad’s prior convictions for aggravated robbery under 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/18-1(b)(1) and for domestic abuse assault under Iowa Code § 708.2A(2)(c) qualified as crimes of violence.

Conrad contends that his conviction in Iowa for domestic abuse assault with the use or display of a weapon is not a crime of violence. An offense under Iowa Code § 708.2A(2)(c) is punishable by more than a year in prison. The elements require proof that an offender (1) committed an assault against a person with an enumerated domestic relationship to the offender, Iowa Code § 708.2A(1), and (2) did so with intent to inflict serious injury upon another, or used or displayed a dangerous weapon in connection with the assault. Id. § 708.2A(2)(c).

In United States v. McGee, 890 F.3d 730, 736-37 (8th Cir. 2018), this court held that assault while displaying a dangerous weapon in violation of Iowa Code § 708.2(3) qualifies as a crime of violence, because the “display” of a dangerous weapon requires at least the threatened use of physical force. As the only difference between the assault statute at issue in McGee and the domestic assault statute at issue here is the identity of the victim, the reasoning of McGee governs § 708.2A(2)(c) as

-2- well. See United States v. Tinlin, 20 F.4th 426, 428 (8th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 1054 (2023).

Conrad argues, however, that McGee is not controlling, because the “use” of a dangerous weapon and the “display” of a dangerous weapon are alternative means of committing the offense. He contends that the “use” of a dangerous weapon to commit a domestic assault does not meet the definition of violent force required by federal law. See Johnson v. United S

Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
whatsapp-icon Back to top