No. 21-3010 ___________________________

Andrew Magdy

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

I.C. System, Inc.

Defendant - Appellee ____________

Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis ____________

Submitted: April 14, 2022 Filed: September 6, 2022 ____________ Before SHEPHERD, ERICKSON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. ____________ SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Andrew Magdy sued I.C. System, Inc. (ICS) under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) for violating 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b), which prohibits a debt collector from contacting a third party about the collection of a debt without the prior consent of the consumer. The district court 1 granted ICS’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that Magdy, a non-consumer, lacked standing to bring a cause of action under § 1692c(b). Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we join other circuits that have reviewed this issue and affirm.

I.

On July 27, 2020, ICS sent Magdy, a bankruptcy attorney, a debt collection letter identifying him as the attorney for a consumer named in the letter.2 In fact, the consumer was not Magdy’s client, the consumer had never identified Magdy as her attorney to anyone, and Magdy had never identified himself as the consumer’s attorney. There is no indication that the consumer consented to ICS contacting attorneys not retained by her about her debt. Unable to recognize the consumer’s name, Magdy engaged in an extensive search of his files and records to determine if he had ever represented the consumer. He found nothing to indicate that she was a past or present client. This search cost Magdy valuable time and resources that he could have spent working on matters for actual clients.

Magdy filed suit in Missouri state court, and ICS properly removed the action to the district court. Magdy asserted that ICS violated § 1692c(b) when it contacted him regarding the debt of a consumer whom he did not represent, without the consumer’s consent, and that he suffered injury as a result. ICS timely moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that third-party attorneys lack standing to sue under § 1692c. The district court determined that ICS’s letter to Magdy violated § 1692c(b) but nevertheless agreed that Magdy lacked standing to sue under § 1692c and, thus, entered judgment on the pleadings against Magdy. Though Magdy “ask[ed] for leave to replead his claims pursuant to Section 1692d” in his response

1 The Honorable Henry E. Autrey, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. 2 Magdy alleges that this letter is one of approximately 160 such letters sent to him by ICS, but he claims a violation of the FDCPA for only this letter. -2- to ICS’s motion, he never filed a motion for leave to amend his pleadings or for remand.

II.

Magdy argues that the district court erred in finding that he lacks standing to sue under § 1692c(b).3 In a matter of first impression for this Court, Magdy’s appeal presents a straightforward question of statutory interpretation: whether Magdy, a third-party attorney unaffiliated with the relevant consumer, falls within the class of plaintiffs that Congress has authorized to sue under § 1692c(b). Magdy asks us to read § 1692c(b) as giving him, a third party contacted about a consumer’s debt without the consumer’s consent, a cause