No. 19-2677 ___________________________

United States of America,

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,

v.

Stacy A. Lyman,

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant. ____________

Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City ____________

Submitted: November 20, 2020 Filed: March 25, 2021 ____________ Before COLLOTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. ____________ COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

In 2018, Stacy Lyman pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon. See 21 U.S.C. § 846; 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court1 concluded that Lyman was subject to an enhanced sentence for the firearm conviction under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because he had sustained at least three prior convictions for a “serious drug offense.” See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), (e)(2)(A)(ii). As a result, Lyman’s statutory penalty on the firearm conviction changed from a maximum sentence of ten years to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years (and a maximum of life) under the ACCA. See id. § 924(a)(2), (e)(1). The court imposed concurrent terms of 205 months’ imprisonment on each count. Lyman appeals the sentence on the ground that he did not have three qualifying convictions under the ACCA.

The prior convictions at issue arose from charges that Lyman sold drugs in Missouri on three occasions in 1996. State prosecutors charged Lyman with violating a Missouri statute that made it “unlawful for any person to distribute, deliver, manufacture, [or] produce . . . a controlled substance.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 195.211.1 (1994) (current version at Mo. Rev. Stat. § 579.055). On October 6, 1997, Lyman pleaded guilty to three counts.

Lyman first mounts a collateral attack on the Missouri convictions. He asserts that the drug trafficking statute in Missouri included a mens rea requirement of knowledge, but the charging documents incorrectly alleged that he acted with either knowledge or recklessness. Lyman therefore posits that he might have been convicted based on recklessness alone, which in his view would make the convictions invalid.

Whatever mens rea element was required by state law or applied in the state court proceedings, Lyman cannot attack his prior convictions on that ground in this

1 The Honorable Greg Kays, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

-2- federal proceeding. With the exception of convictions obtained in violation of the right to counsel, a defendant has no right “to collaterally attack prior convictions” in the course of his federal sentencing proceeding. Custis v. United States, 511U.S.485, 487 (1994). Lyman acknowledges that he was represented by counsel in the state proceedings, so his first contention is foreclosed by Custis.

Lyman’s second assertion on appeal is that the prior state convictions do not qualify as predicate offenses under the ACCA. He contends that a state drug trafficking offense qualifies as a “serious drug offense” under § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) only if knowledge (as opposed to recklessness) was an essential element of the state offense. Lyman did not raise this argument in the district court, so we review for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). To obtain relief, Lyman must show an obvious error that affected his substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507U.S.725, 732-35 (