No. 20-1674 ___________________________

Levi Wilson, Individually; M W, by and through his next friend Levi Wilson

Plaintiffs - Appellants

v. Scott Lamp, in his individual and official capacity; Iowa, State of; Jessica Dorhout- VanEngen, in her individual and official capacity; John Doe, in his individual and official capacity

Defendants - Appellees ____________

Appeal from United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa - Western ____________

Submitted: March 18, 2021 Filed: April 26, 2021 ____________ Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges. ____________ BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Levi Wilson and his son M.W. sued three police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment, violation of the Iowa Constitution, and common law invasion of privacy. The district court denied summary judgment, but this court reversed in part and remanded for trial. Wilson v. Lamp (“Wilson I”), 901 F.3d 981, 991 (8th Cir. 2018).

On remand, the district court held a trial on the state law claims, as well as the federal excessive force claim. On the state claims—invasion of privacy and Iowa illegal search or seizure—the district court 1 granted judgment as a matter of law. The jury found for defendants on the excessive force claims. Plaintiffs appeal. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

I.

At the close of trial, the district court granted defendants’ Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law on the invasion of privacy and Iowa search and seizure claims.

Rule 50(a) permits dismissal when ‘there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for’ the non-moving party at the close of that party’s evidence. We have on numerous occasions spelled out in detail the criteria for the grant of such motions. In Dace v. ACF Industries, Inc., 722 F.2d 374 (8th Cir. 1983), for example, we stated that, in considering a motion for directed verdict or for j.n.o.v., the court must: (1) resolve direct factual conflicts in favor of the nonmovant, (2) assume as true all facts supporting the nonmovant which the evidence tended to prove, (3) give the nonmovant the benefit of all reasonable inferences, and (4) deny the motion if the evidence so viewed would allow reasonable jurors to differ as to the conclusions that could be drawn. Id. at 375. Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1080 (8th Cir. 1999).

The district court later denied motions for a new trial on the invasion of privacy and Iowa search and seizure claims. “In determining whether a verdict is

1 Honorable Leonard T. Strand, United States District Chief Judge for the Northern District of Iowa.

-2- against the weight of the evidence, the trial court can rely on its own reading of the evidence—it can weigh the evidence, disbelieve witnesses, and grant a new trial even where there is substantial evidence to sustain the verdict.” White v. Pence, 961 F.2d 776, 780 (8th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted). “[G]reat deference is to be accorded the trial judge’s decision in such rulings.” Id. at 781.

A.

Plaintiffs argue the district court erred in dismissing their Iowa unreasonable search and seizure claims as a matter of law.

Iowa’s constitutional protections from unreasonable searches and seizures may extend beyond the reach o