2024 Supreme(US)(ca9) 4
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Yaakov Markel – Appellant
Versus
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America – Respondent
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT YAAKOV MARKEL, No. 23-55088
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:19-cv-10704- v. JWH-SK UNION OF ORTHODOX JEWISH CONGREGATIONS OF AMERICA, OPINION a corporation; NACHUM RABINOWITZ, an individual; DOES, 1-100,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John W. Holcomb, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 3, 2024 Pasadena, California
Filed December 30, 2024 Before: Ryan D. Nelson, Lawrence VanDyke, and Gabriel P. Sanchez, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge R. Nelson; Concurrence by Judge Sanchez 2 MARKEL V. UOJCA
SUMMARY *
First Amendment Ministerial Exception
The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America (OU) and Rabbi Nachum Rabinowitz, holding that the First Amendment’s ministerial exception barred plaintiff Yaakov Markel, whom UO formerly employed as a mashgiach to supervise food preparation for kosher compliance, from bringing employment-related claims. The OU is organized as a not-for-profit corporation whose mission is to serve the Orthodox Jewish community. It runs the largest kosher certification program in the United States, and the program provides most of OU’s revenues. The district court held that OU is a religious organization and that a mashgiach is a “minister” within Orthodox Judaism. Markel’s employment-related claims, therefore, were categorically barred by the First Amendment’s ministerial exception, which precludes the application of “laws governing the employment relationship between a religious institution and certain key employees.” The panel agreed with the district court that the ministerial exception categorically barred Markel’s employment-related claims because UO is a religious organization and a mashgiach is a minister. The acceptance of revenue does not deprive an organization with a religious mission of First Amendment protections. Here, OU was * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. MARKEL V. UOJCA 3
organized to support the Orthodox Jewish Community, its activities primarily serve this purpose, and it holds itself out to the public as religious. Markel’s role was essential to OU’s religious mission. Because only observant Orthodox Jews can serve as a mashgiach for the OU, and because they are necessary to carrying out OU’s religious mission of ensuring the wide availability of kosher food, a mashgiach is a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception. The panel rejected Markel’s argument that the ministerial exception was inapplicable because his dispute involved only secular issues. A religious institution’s decisions, even if facially secular, are often intertwined with religious doctrine. Moreover, a religious organization need not provide any religious justification to invoke the ministerial exception. Finally, the panel held that given the broad purpose of the ministerial exception, it protects a religious organization’s supervisors and religious leaders from claims brought by ministerial employees. Concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Judge Sanchez agreed that the ministerial exception applied under the facts of this case. As a head mashgiach who ensured the kosher certification of grape products, Markel’s work was essential to the spiritual mission of UO. Because Markel qualified as a minister, his claims challenging UO’s tangible employment actions were barred under the ministerial ex