UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MANUEL DE JESUS ORTEGA No. 23-15036 MELENDRES; DAVID RODRIGUEZ; VELIA MERAZ; D.C. No. 2:07-cv- MANUEL NIETO, Jr.; SOMOS 02513-GMS AMERICA,

Plaintiffs-Appellees, OPINION UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor-Plaintiff- Appellee,

v. RUSS SKINNER, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Maricopa County,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona G. Murray Snow, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 20, 2024 San Francisco, California 2 MELENDRES V. SKINNER

Filed August 19, 2024

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Susan P. Graber, and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Wallace

SUMMARY *

Injunction / Court-Appointed Monitor

The panel affirmed the district court’s amended third supplemental permanent injunction in plaintiffs’ class action alleging that the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) racially profiled Latino drivers and passengers under the guise of immigration enforcement. The district court issued a permanent injunction against MCSO in 2013, and several months later issued a supplemental permanent injunction (First Order) appointing an independent monitor (Monitor) responsible for monitoring and assessing MCSO’s compliance with the injunction. In 2016, the district court issued a second supplemental permanent injunction (Second Order) requiring the Maricopa County Sheriff and MCSO to reform MCSO’s internal misconduct investigation procedures. In 2022, the district court issued a third supplemental permanent injunction (Third Order), finding the Sheriff in contempt for non-compliance with the Second Order and * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. MELENDRES V. SKINNER 3

setting forth curative measures, including creating a Constitutional Policing Authority (CPA) and assigning to the Monitor the CPA’s duties. The panel held that the district court relied on its inherent equitable powers rather than Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 in issuing the Third Order, and therefore Rule 53’s limits, if any, do not apply. The panel rejected the Sheriff’s contention that the district court’s delineation and assignment of the CPA’s duties to the Monitor violated Article III of the Constitution and separation of powers principles. First, the district court acted within the general bounds of its inherent powers. In certain circumstances, the district court, relying on its inherent powers, may vest a non-judicial officer with control over narrow areas of a governmental defendant’s operations. Second, the panel held that Paragraphs 346, 347, and 350 of the Third Order do not impermissibly omit a mechanism for judicial review of the Monitor’s actions because the First Order provides for adequate judicial review. Finally, the panel held that Paragraphs 346, 347, and 350 do not contravene Fed. R. Civ. P. 65’s requirement that an injunction must state its terms specifically and describe in reasonable detail the act or acts restrained or required. 4 MELENDRES V. SKINNER

COUNSEL Amy S. Heath (argued), Covington & Burling LLP, San Francisco, California; Stanley Young, Covington & Burling LLP, Palo Alto, California; Natasha Babazadeh (argued) and Elizabeth Hecker, Attorneys, Civil Rights Division, Appellate Section; Kristen Clarke, Assistant Attorney General; United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; Victoria A. Lopez and Christine K. Wee, ACLU Foundation, Phoenix, Arizona; Cecillia D. Wang, ACLU Foundation, San Francisco, California; for Pla