UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JANE DOE, Nos. 1-10, No. 22-56216

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:20-cv-10713- v. MWF-RAO DANIEL S. FITZGERALD, OPINION Defendant-Appellant, US ATTORNEY'S OFFICE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK,

Real-party-in-interest- Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 29, 2024 Pasadena, California

Filed May 24, 2024 2 DOE V. FITZGERALD

Before: Ronald M. Gould, Sandra S. Ikuta, and Danielle J. Forrest, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Ikuta

SUMMARY *

Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act

The panel affirmed the district court’s order staying proceedings in an action under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act pending the resolution of a criminal action. Ten plaintiffs sued Daniel Fitzgerald under the civil remedy provision of the TVPRA, 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a), for multiple sex trafficking violations, among other things. The government intervened and moved to stay the litigation pending the resolution of a criminal action involving a different defendant, Peter Nygard. The district court granted the stay motion under 18 U.S.C. § 1595(b)(1), which requires that any civil action filed under § 1595(a) “shall be stayed during the pendency of any criminal action arising out of the same occurrence in which the claimant is the victim.” Fitzgerald appealed the district court’s stay order, arguing that the district court erroneously concluded that a stay was mandated under § 1595(b)(1) and also erred in staying the entire civil action rather than staying only those

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. DOE V. FITZGERALD 3

proceedings that had a connection to the criminal case against Nygard. The panel held that it had jurisdiction to review the stay order as final and appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because the stay was lengthy and indefinite and thus placed the litigants effectively out of court. The panel held that a lengthy and indefinite stay order is reviewable as a final decision regardless of whether the plaintiff or defendant appeals the order. The panel held that the district court properly granted a mandatory stay under § 1595(b)(1) because the following three requirements were met: (1) a criminal action was pending; (2) the criminal action arose out of the same occurrence as the civil action; and (3) the plaintiffs in the civil action were victims of an occurrence that was the same in the civil and criminal proceedings. The panel held that § 1595(b)(1) does not in addition require that the defendant in the civil action be a named defendant in the related criminal action. The panel held that the court could rely on the pleadings to determine whether “same occurrence” requirement was met. Here, comparing the plaintiffs’ complaint and the Nygard indictment, the panel concluded that the complaint alleged events that were identical to the events that gave rise to the claims in the indictment. The panel affirmed the district court’s ruling, but it held that the district court erred in concluding that the government has a lower evidentiary burden than other litigants when seeking a stay under § 1595(b)(1). The panel further held that, if a stay is required under § 1595(b)(1), then the district court must stay the entire action. 4 DOE V. FITZGERALD

COUNSEL Ernest E. Badw