UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT In re: JANE DOE, No. 22-70098 ______________________________ D.C. No. 2:17- JANE DOE, cr-00072-RFB Petitioner,

v. ORDER AND AMENDED UNITED STATES DISTRICT OPINION COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA, LAS VEGAS, Respondent, VONTEAK ALEXANDER; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Real Parties in Interest.

Petition for Writ of Mandamus

Argued and Submitted September 19, 2022 San Francisco, California

Filed October 25, 2022 Amended January 18, 2023 Before: Susan P. Graber, Michelle T. Friedland, and Lucy H. Koh, Circuit Judges. 2 DOE V. USDC-NVL

Order; Opinion by Judge Graber

SUMMARY *

Mandamus / Crime Victims’ Rights Act

The panel filed (1) an order amending its opinion, denying a petition for panel rehearing, and denying on behalf of the court a petition for rehearing en banc; and (2) an amended opinion granting Jane Doe’s petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3), a provision of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act. The defendant kidnapped Doe, then age twelve, and drove her from California to Nevada knowing that she would engage in prostitution. The defendant entered into a written plea agreement pursuant to which, in exchange for the government’s promise to drop five serious criminal charges, he would plead guilty to two lesser crimes (interstate travel in aid of unlawful activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)(A)) and would pay Doe restitution. The district court nonetheless concluded that it lacked statutory authority to order the defendant to pay restitution to Doe. Applying ordinary standards of review, rather than the mandamus standard set forth in Bauman v. United States District Court, 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977), the panel reviewed de novo the questions of law raised by the parties.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. DOE V. USDC-NVL 3

The panel published the opinion to reiterate what this court held in two cases decided three decades ago: 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3) grants statutory authority to district courts to award restitution whenever a defendant agrees in a plea agreement to pay restitution. The defendant did not dispute that § 3663(a)(3) authorizes district courts to award restitution as agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement. Rather, he argued that the district court lacked authority to award restitution under the plea agreement in this case. The defendant first argued that the restitution provision in the plea agreement unambiguously limited the district court’s authority such that the court could award restitution only for those crimes that trigger mandatory restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 2259; and that because none of the defendant’s conduct amounted to a crime that fell within that category, the district court lacked authority to award Doe restitution under the plain terms of the plea agreement. The defendant then argued that even if the plea agreement was ambiguous, this court should interpret that ambiguity in his favor and hold that the district court lacked authority to award restitution under the plea agreement. Rejecting both arguments, the panel wrote that the extrinsic evidence unambiguously demonstrated that the defendant agreed to pay restitution for Doe’s loss, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3); and, accordingly, the rule that ambiguities are construed against the government did not apply. The panel held that the district court’s holding that it lacked sta