UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JAY HYMAS, DBA Dosmen Farms, No. 20-35733

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:20-cv- 05036-SMJ v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE OPINION INTERIOR,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Salvador Mendoza, Jr., District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 8, 2023 Seattle, Washington

Filed July 12, 2023 Before: Michael Daly Hawkins, Carlos T. Bea, and Daniel A. Bress, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bea 2 HYMAS V. USDOI

SUMMARY *

Filing Fees

The panel affirmed the district court’s decision ordering pro se plaintiff Jay Hymas to pay a partial filing fee in his civil action against the U.S. Department of the Interior. Plaintiff, an unemployed non-prisoner with approximately $1,000 in cash, filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), i.e., without repaying filing fees or costs, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The district court granted Plaintiff’s application in part and ordered him to pay a partial filing fee of $100. An order denying an IFP application is immediately appealable as a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, but Plaintiff’s application was not denied altogether. The panel held that the same rationale for allowing an immediate appeal of an order denying an IFP application altogether applied in this case: if Plaintiff did not pay the partial fee, there was nothing for the district court to do but dismiss the action. The panel held that district courts have the authority to impose partial filing fees on non-prisoner civil litigators under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The panel rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the holding in Olivares v. Marshall, 59 F.3d 109, 111 (9th Cir. 1995) (courts have the discretion to impose partial filing fees under the IFP statute), was limited to IFP applications brought by prisoners. The panel also * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. HYMAS V. USDOI 3

rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the Prison Litigation Reform Act superseded the holding in Olivares. The fact that the statute dictates how the initial portion of a prisoner’s full fee is to be calculated does not shed any light on the authority of the court to impose partial filing fees on non- prisoners. The panel next held that, based on Plaintiff’s own representations in the IFP application, the district court’s determination that a $100 filing fee was fair and appropriate was not implausible, illogical, or unsupported by the record.

COUNSEL Douglas A. Smith (argued) and Maximillian W. Hirsch (argued), Mayer Brown LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Molly Smith (argued), Tyler H. L. Tornabene, and John T. Drake, Assistant United States Attorneys; Vanessa R. Waldref, United States Attorney; Office of the United States Attorney, Spokane, Washington; for Defendant-Appellee. 4 HYMAS V. USDOI

OPINION BEA, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Jay Hymas appeals the district court’s decision ordering him to pay a $100 partial filing fee in his civil action. Plaintiff, an unemployed non-prisoner with approximately $1,000 in cash, filed a pro se complaint against the United States Department of Interior (DOI) asserting violations of federal contracting law and financial assistance law. 1 Ordinarily, the fee for filing this civil action would be $402: a $350 filing fee and a $52 administrative fee. Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauper