UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 16-30013 Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. v. 2:15-cr-00109-JLR-1 RAYMOND LEE FRYBERG, JR., Defendant-Appellant. OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 8, 2017 Seattle, Washington

Filed April 21, 2017

Before: Susan P. Graber, Sandra S. Ikuta, and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Graber 2 UNITED STATES V. FRYBERG

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

Affirming a conviction for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), the panel held that a return of service that the Government used to prove that the defendant had been served with notice of a hearing on a domestic violence protection order was admissible under the public record exception to hearsay in Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(A)(ii), and that admission of the return of service did not violate the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.

The panel rejected the defendant’s other arguments in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition.

COUNSEL John Henry Browne (argued), Law Office of John Henry Browne P.S., Seattle, Washington; Kany M. Levine, The Levine Law Firm PLLC, Seattle, Washington; for Defendant- Appellant. Bruce Miyake (argued), Assistant United States Attorney; Annette L. Hayes, United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office, Seattle, Washington; for Plaintiff- Appellee.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. UNITED STATES V. FRYBERG 3

OPINION GRABER, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Raymond Lee Fryberg, Jr., appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). He argues several grounds for reversal, including the allegedly erroneous admission into evidence of a return of service that the Government used to prove that Defendant had been served with notice of a hearing on a domestic violence protection order. We conclude that the admission of the return of service did not violate either the rule against hearsay or the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and we affirm Defendant’s conviction.1

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In August 2002, Jamie Gobin sought a domestic violence protection order against Defendant in a Tulalip tribal court near Marysville, Washington.2 On August 19, the court issued a temporary protection order and a notice of hearing concerning a permanent protection order. Attempts to serve Defendant with the temporary protection order and the notice of the hearing were unsuccessful, prompting the tribal court to issue a second temporary order and hearing notice on August 27, setting the hearing for September 10, 2002. The next day, Officer Jesus Echevarria—a tribal police officer and

1 In this opinion, we address only the issue of the admissibility of the return of service. We reject the other arguments raised by Defendant in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. 2 Defendant is a member of the Tulalip Tribes, as is Gobin. 4 UNITED STATES V. FRYBERG Jamie Gobin’s brother-in-law—filed a completed return of service with the tribal court. The return of service reads, in relevant part, as follows: “I served Raymond Lee Fryberg Jr. with the . . . Temporary Order for Protection and Notice of Hearing.” The return states that service was effect