Appellant

v. United States Department of State, et al.,

Appellees

BEFORE: Henderson, Millett*, and Walker, Circuit Judges

ORDER

Upon consideration of the emergency motion for injunction pending appeal and for expedited appeal on the merits, the opposition thereto, and the reply, it is

ORDERED that the motion for an injunction pending appeal be denied. Appellant has not satisfied the stringent requirements for an injunction pending appeal. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); D.C. Circuit Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures 33 (2024).

The Clerk is directed to enter a briefing schedule and to schedule this case for oral argument on the first appropriate date in September 2025.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT: Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk

BY: /s/ Selena R. Gancasz Deputy Clerk

* A statement by Circuit Judge Millett, dissenting from the denial of an injunction pending appeal, is attached. MILLETT, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I would grant the motion for an injunction pending appeal. The Conference of Catholic Bishops is likely to succeed on appeal and is suffering irreparable injuries.

1

With respect to the likelihood of success on the merits, the district court dismissed the case solely on a jurisdictional ground, reasoning that the Conference’s case seeks to enforce only a contractual right for money and so must proceed in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491. See United States Conference of Catholic Bishops v. United States Dep’t of State, 25-cv-00465, 2025 WL 763738, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2025). That conclusion cannot be reconciled with the content of the complaint, the sources of the rights asserted, or long-settled Supreme Court and circuit precedent recognizing that challenges to the lawfulness of agency action are properly prosecuted under the Administrative Procedure Act even if the plaintiff stands to benefit contractually once the agencies’ legal missteps are corrected.

To determine whether the Conference’s claims against the government “sound[] in contract,” and therefore may not be brought in federal district court, we “consider both ‘the source of the rights upon which the plaintiff bases its claims’ and ‘the type of relief sought (or appropriate).’” Albrecht v. Committee on Emp. Benefits of Fed. Reserve Emp. Benefits Sys., 357 F.3d 62, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).

Starting with the first prong, on its face, the Conference’s complaint raises traditional claims under the Administrative Procedure Act, not contract law. The legal sources of the rights it asserts are entirely statutory, not contractual. The 2 Conference argues that the State Department’s sudden, unreasoned, and unjustified termination of the Refugee Resettlement Program’s funding—money that had already been appropriated by Congress—violates federal law, not its contract. The Conference grounds its claims in the legal requirements of the Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1522, the Impoundment Control Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 682-684, and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. See ECF No. 29 (Amended Compl.) ¶¶ 70-117.

The proof of the statutory character of the claims is in the pudding. To decide this case, the court will have to interpret those federal laws and review the State Department’s administrative record. The court will have little, if any, need to analyze or interpret the Conference’s contracts with the