____________ No. 25-5157 September Term, 2024

1:25-cv-00935-PLF

Filed On: May 16, 2025

National Treasury Employees Union,

Appellee

v. Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al.,

Appellants

BEFORE: Henderson, Walker, and Childs*, Circuit Judges

ORDER

Upon consideration of the emergency motion for stay pending appeal and an immediate administrative stay, the opposition thereto, and the reply, it is

ORDERED that the motion for stay be granted. The Government has met the requirements for a stay pending appeal. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). A stay applicant must show that (1) it “is likely to succeed on the merits,” (2) it “will be irreparably injured absent a stay,” (3) a stay will not “substantially injure” other interested parties, and (4) a stay is in the “public interest.” Id.

1. The Government is likely to prevail in its appeal of the district court’s preliminary injunction. To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it will suffer irreparable harm while the case is pending. See Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 20, 32 (2008). The National Treasury Employees Union failed to establish

* A statement by Circuit Judge Childs, dissenting from this order, is attached. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT ____________ No. 25-5157 September Term, 2024 irreparable harm. That is a sufficient basis for vacating a preliminary injunction.1 See Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“movant’s failure to show any irreparable harm is . . . grounds for refusing to issue a preliminary injunction, even if the other three factors . . . merit such relief”).

The Union says it will suffer two irreparable harms. Neither qualifies.

First, the Union asserts that without a preliminary injunction it will lose bargaining power and suffer reputational harm that will deter present and future membership. But those harms are speculative because they would materialize only after an agency terminates a collective-bargaining agreement, and the Government directed agencies to refrain from terminating collective-bargaining agreements or decertifying bargaining units until after the litigation concludes. Ex. 1-B, National Treasury Employees Union v. Trump, No. 25-cv-0935, 2025 WL 1218044 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 2025), ECF No. 26-1; see also Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (irreparable harm must be “likely,” not merely “possib[le]”).2 So the Union was not entitled to equitable relief on this basis.3

Second, the Union says it will suffer an irreparable financial injury from the loss of automatically withheld union dues. But such “financial injuries are rarely irreparable because they are presumptively remediable through monetary damages.” Clevinger v. Advocacy Holdings, Inc., __ F.4th __, No. 23-7116, 2025 WL 1197927, at *2 (D.C. Cir. 2025). Here, the Union can seek to recover missing dues in subsequent Federal Labor

1 Because the district court’s preliminary injunction is likely to be vacated for lack of irreparable harm, we need not address the Government’s arguments regarding the Union’s likelihood of success on the merits. 2 On this point, Judge Childs’ thoughtful dissent implies agreement. A version of her question to the Government can be addressed to the Union: “How” is it possible that the absence of “the district court injunction will cause irreparable injury when the Government itself voluntarily imposed that same constraint?” Dissenting Stat