Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MEDICAL MARIJUANA, INC., ET AL. v. HORN CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 23–365. Argued October 15, 2024—Decided April 2, 2025 Seeking relief from his accident-related chronic pain, Douglas Horn pur- chased and began taking “Dixie X,” a purportedly THC-free, non-psy- choactive CBD tincture produced by Medical Marijuana, Inc. A few weeks later, however, Horn’s employer selected him for random drug screening, and Horn tested positive for THC. After he refused to par- ticipate in a substance abuse program, his employer fired him. Horn then sued Medical Marijuana under the Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO), which creates a cause of action for “[a]ny person injured in his business or property” by reason of a crim- inal RICO violation. 18 U. S. C. §1964(c). The District Court granted summary judgment to Medical Marijuana. Horn’s lost employment derived from a personal injury (ingesting THC), the court reasoned. And in the court’s view, §1964(c) forecloses recovery not only for per- sonal injuries, but also for business or property harms that result from such injuries. The Second Circuit reversed, concluding that Horn had been “injured in his business” when he lost his job. In so holding, the Second Circuit rejected the “antecedent-personal-injury bar,” a rule adopted by several circuits that precludes recovery for business or property losses that derive from a personal injury. Held: Under civil RICO, §1964(c), a plaintiff may seek treble damages for business or property loss even if the loss resulted from a personal injury. Pp. 4–19. (a) The sole question before the Court is whether civil RICO categor- ically bars recovery for business or property losses that derive from a personal injury. The Court does not address issues implicated by this case but outside the scope of the question presented, i.e., whether Horn suffered a personal injury when he consumed THC, whether the term 2 MEDICAL MARIJUANA, INC. v. HORN

Syllabus

“business” encompasses all aspects of “employment,” and what “in- jured in his . . . property” means for purposes of §1964(c). Pp. 4–5. (b) Section 1964(c) provides that “[a]ny person injured in his busi- ness or property by reason of a violation of [RICO] may sue . . . .” The ordinary meaning of “injure” is to “cause harm or damage to” or to “hurt.” American Heritage Dictionary 676. So the meaning of §1964(c) is straightforward: A plaintiff has been “injured in his business or property” if his business or property has been harmed or damaged. Even so, §1964(c) does not allow recovery for all harms. By explicitly permitting recovery for harms to business and property, §1964(c) im- plicitly excludes recovery for harm to one’s person. But the business or property requirement operates with respect to the kinds of harm for which the plaintiff can recover, not the cause of the harm for which he seeks relief. For example, a gas station owner beaten in a robbery cannot recover for his pain and suffering. But if injuries from the rob- bery force him to shut his doors, he can recover for the loss of his busi- ness. A plaintiff can seek damages for business or property loss, in other words, regardless of whether the loss resulte