Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MONSALVO VELÁZQUEZ v. BONDI, ATTORNEY GENERAL CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

No. 23–929. Argued November 12, 2024—Decided April 22, 2025

The federal government initiated removal proceedings against petitioner Monsalvo Velázquez, who asked the government to suspend its re- moval efforts or, alternatively, to permit him to leave the United States voluntarily. The immigration judge concluded Monsalvo was remova- ble but granted him an opportunity to voluntarily depart within 60 days. After the Board of Immigration Appeals rejected his appeal, it granted Monsalvo a new 60-day voluntary departure period. The 60th day fell on Saturday, December 11, 2021. Monsalvo filed a motion to reopen proceedings on Monday, December 13. The Board rejected that motion, concluding that the voluntary departure period had expired on Saturday, and Monsalvo’s motion was therefore too late. Monsalvo asked the Board to reconsider that conclusion, but the Board refused. Monsalvo then petitioned for judicial review in the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the Board, holding that the voluntary de- parture deadline in 8 U. S. C. §1229c(b)(2) refers to calendar days with no extension for deadlines that fall on weekends or holidays. Held: 1. This Court has jurisdiction to review Monsalvo’s petition. Under §1252, courts may review “final order[s] of removal” and “all questions of law” arising from them. Monsalvo’s petition sought judicial review of a legal question about the meaning of a term in his final removal order—specifically, the meaning of “60 days” for voluntary departure. Although Monsalvo did not challenge his removability, nothing in §1252 requires an individual to press a challenge to one term in a final order of removal just to secure judicial review of another. This Court 2 MONSALVO VELÁZQUEZ v. BONDI

Syllabus

rejects the government’s argument that a petition must include a chal- lenge to removability to secure judicial review. Such an interpretation would force litigants to assert meritless claims simply to obtain juris- diction. Pp. 6–11. 2. Under §1229c(b)(2), a voluntary-departure deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday extends to the next business day. The Board and the Tenth Circuit understood “days” to bear the ordinary meaning of calendar days, no more or less. But evidence suggests a specialized meaning in legal settings where the term “days” is often understood to extend deadlines falling on a weekend or legal holiday to the next business day. When Congress adopts a new law against the backdrop of a “longstanding administrative construction,” the Court generally presumes the new provision works in harmony with what came before. Haig v. Agee, 453 U. S. 280, 297–298. Since at least the 1950s, immigration regulations have provided that when calculat- ing deadlines, the term “day” carries its specialized meaning by exclud- ing Sundays and legal holidays (and later Saturdays) if a deadline would otherwise fall on one of those days. Congress enacted §1229c(b)(2) as part of §304 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Im- migrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) against this consistent regulatory backdrop. The government concedes tha