Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

DELLIGATTI v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 23–825. Argued November 12, 2024—Decided March 21, 2025 Title 18 U. S. C. §924(c) subjects a person who uses or carries a firearm during a “crime of violence” to a mandatory minimum sentence of five years. §§924(c)(1)(A)(i) and (D)(ii). Section 924(c)(3)(A) defines a “crime of violence” as a felony that “has as an element the use, at- tempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” To determine whether an offense falls within §924(c)(3)(A)’s “elements clause,” the Court applies the categorical ap- proach, asking whether the offense in question always involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force. Here, Salvatore Delli- gatti was convicted of violating §924(c) after he recruited gang mem- bers to kill a suspected police informant and gave them a loaded re- volver to carry out the job. Before trial, Delligatti moved to dismiss his §924(c) charge on the ground that the charge lacked the required predicate crime of violence, but the District Court denied his motion. Delligatti’s indictment charged him with attempted murder under the violent-crimes-in-aid- of-racketeering (VICAR) statute, §1959(a)(5), which required proof that Delligatti had attempted second-degree murder under New York law. Delligatti argued that a VICAR offense predicated on New York second-degree murder is not a crime of violence under §924(c)’s ele- ments clause because homicide under New York law can be committed by omission, defined as the failure to perform a legal duty. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s conclusion that New York at- tempted second-degree murder is a crime of violence for purposes of §924(c)(3)(A). Held: The knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the “use” of “physical force” against another person within the meaning of §924(c)(3)(A). Pp. 4–13. 2 DELLIGATTI v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

(a) It is impossible to deliberately cause physical harm without the use of physical force under §924(c). In United States v. Castleman, 572 U. S. 157, this Court held that under §922(g)(9)—which prohibits any- one convicted of “a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” from own- ing a firearm—“the knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury necessarily involves the use of physical force,” id., at 169. The Court’s reasoning proceeded in two steps. First, the Court found it “impossible to cause bodily injury without applying [the] force” needed to commit common-law battery. Id., at 170 (emphasis added). Second, the Court held that “the knowing or intentional application of force is a ‘use’ of force” in that sense. Ibid. (emphasis added). The logic of Castleman extends to §924(c). Although the parties stip- ulate that §922(g)(9) and §924(c) require different levels of force— battery-level force versus violent force—that difference is immaterial here. As the Court held in Stokeling v. United States, 586 U. S. 73, 80, violent force encompasses “the ‘force’ required for common-law rob- bery.” Although a mere touch is not sufficient force for common-law robbery, any force that actua