Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

E.M.D. SALES, INC., ET AL. v. CARRERA ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23–217. Argued November 5, 2024—Decided January 15, 2025 In 1938, Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), guar- anteeing a federal minimum wage for covered workers, 29 U. S. C. §206(a)(1), and requiring overtime pay for those working more than 40 hours per week, §207(a)(1). Congress exempted many types of employ- ees from the FLSA’s overtime-pay requirement, including outside salesmen who primarily work away from their employer’s place of busi- ness. §213(a)(1). The law places the burden on the employer to show that an exemption applies. Petitioner EMD distributes food products in the Washington, D. C., area and employs sales representatives who manage inventory and take orders at grocery stores. Several sales representatives sued EMD alleging that the company violated the FLSA by failing to pay them overtime. EMD argued that the sales representatives were outside salesmen and therefore exempt from the FLSA’s overtime-pay require- ment. After a bench trial, the District Court found EMD liable for overtime because EMD did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that its sales representatives were outside salesmen. On appeal, EMD argued that the District Court should have used the less stringent pre- ponderance-of-the-evidence standard instead of the clear-and-convinc- ing-evidence standard. Applying Circuit precedent, the Fourth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the District Court’s judgment. Held: The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies when an em- ployer seeks to demonstrate that an employee is exempt from the min- imum-wage and overtime-pay provisions of the FLSA. Pp. 4–8. (a) When Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938, the preponderance- of-the-evidence standard was the default in American civil litigation, and it remains so today. In civil litigation, the Court has deviated from this default standard in three main circumstances. First, if a statute 2 E.M.D. SALES, INC. v. CARRERA

Syllabus

requires a heightened standard of proof, courts must apply it. See, e.g., §§218c(b)(1), 464(c). Second, the Constitution can mandate a height- ened standard of proof. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254; Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418. Third, in certain rare situations involving coercive Government action, such as taking away a person’s citizenship, a heightened standard may apply. See, e.g., Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 129. But in most civil cases, including employment-discrimination cases under Title VII, the Court has con- sistently applied the preponderance standard. See, e.g., Price Water- house v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228. Pp. 4–6. (b) The FLSA does not specify a standard of proof for exemptions, and when a civil statute is silent, courts typically apply the preponder- ance standard. See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U. S. 279. This case does not involve constitutional rights that would require a heightened standard, nor does it involve the Government taking unusual or coer- cive action against an individual. FLSA cases are similar to Title VII employment-discrimination cases, where the Court has applied the preponderance standard. P. 6