Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

BOUARFA v. MAYORKAS, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 23–583. Argued October 15, 2024—Decided December 10, 2024 Amina Bouarfa, a U. S. citizen, began the process of obtaining perma- nent legal residence for Ala’a Hamayel, her noncitizen spouse, by filing a visa petition with the U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Relevant here, USCIS “shall . . . approve” a visa petition if it “determines that the facts stated in the petition are true” and that the noncitizen is the petitioner’s spouse. 8 U. S. C. §1154(b) (emphasis added). But if the noncitizen has previously sought or received an im- migration benefit “by reason of a marriage determined by the Attorney General to have been entered into for the purpose of evading the im- migration laws”—known as the sham-marriage bar—the agency must deny the petition. §1154(c). USCIS initially approved Bouarfa’s visa petition. Two years later, the agency sent Bouarfa a Notice of Intent to Revoke its approval based on evidence suggesting that her husband had previously entered into a marriage for the purpose of evading im- migration laws. Although Bouarfa vigorously denied the evidence, the agency revoked its prior approval based on the Secretary of Homeland Security’s statutory authority under §1155 to “revoke the approval of any petition” “for good and sufficient cause.” The Board of Immigra- tion Appeals affirmed the revocation, finding that USCIS’s determina- tion that Hamayel had entered into a prior sham marriage that would have prevented initial approval of the petition under §1154(c) consti- tuted “good and sufficient cause” for revocation under §1155. Bouarfa challenged the agency’s revocation in federal court. The District Court dismissed the suit, holding that §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)—a provision that strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain dis- cretionary agency decisions—barred judicial review of the agency’s revocation. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 2 BOUARFA v. MAYORKAS

Syllabus Held: Revocation of an approved visa petition under §1155 based on a sham-marriage determination by the Secretary is the kind of discre- tionary decision that falls within the purview of §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain actions “in the discretion of ” the agency. Pp. 6–12. (a) Section 1155 is a quintessential grant of discretion: The Secre- tary “may” revoke a previously approved visa petition “at any time” for what the Secretary deems “good and sufficient cause.” Such a broad grant of authority “fairly exudes deference” to the Secretary and is similar to other statutes held to “ ‘commi[t]’ ” a decision “ ‘to agency dis- cretion.’ ” Webster v. Doe, 486 U. S. 592, 600. Congress did not impose specific criteria or conditions limiting this authority, nor did it pre- scribe how or when the Secretary must act. Context reinforces the discretionary nature of §1155. Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s neighboring provision, §1252(a)(2)(B)(i), bars judicial review under specific provi- sions, each of which contains language indicating that the decisions involved are entrusted to the discretion of the Attorney General. Sec- tion 1155 contains similar language. Pp. 6–8. (b) Bouarfa argu