Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

FISCHER v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 23–5572. Argued April 16, 2024—Decided June 28, 2024 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposes criminal liability on anyone who corruptly “alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, docu- ment, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.” 18 U. S. C. §1512(c)(1). The next subsection extends that prohibition to anyone who “otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so.” §1512(c)(2). Petitioner Joseph Fischer was charged with violating §1512(c)(2) for his conduct on Jan- uary 6, 2021. On that day, Congress convened in a joint session to certify the votes in the 2020 Presidential election. While they did so, a crowd of supporters of then-President Donald Trump gathered out- side the Capitol, and some eventually forced their way into the build- ing, breaking windows and assaulting police. App. 189. This breach of the Capitol delayed the certification of the vote. The criminal com- plaint alleges that Fischer was among those who invaded the building. Fischer was charged with various crimes for his actions on January 6, including obstructing an official proceeding in violation of §1512(c)(2). He moved to dismiss that charge, arguing that the provision criminal- izes only attempts to impair the availability or integrity of evidence. The District Court granted his motion in relevant part. A divided panel of the D. C. Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceed- ings. Held: To prove a violation of §1512(c)(2), the Government must establish that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or other things used in an official proceeding, or attempted to do so. (a) To determine the scope of the residual “otherwise” clause in §1512(c)(2), the Court must decide how it is linked to its “surrounding 2 FISCHER v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

words,” Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 536 (plurality opinion), and “ ‘give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of [the] statute.’ ” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U. S. 362, 404 (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539). The Court considers both “the spe- cific context” in which (c)(2) appears “and the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U. S. 337, 341. (1) Section 1512(c)(1) describes particular types of criminal con- duct in specific terms. The purpose of (c)(2) is, as the parties agree, to cover some set of “matters not specifically contemplated” by (c)(1). Re- public of Iraq v. Beaty, 556 U. S. 848, 860. Perhaps Congress sought to criminalize all obstructive acts in §1512(c), and having named a few examples in (c)(1), devised (c)(2) to prohibit the rest. But (c)(2) could have a narrower scope if Congress designed it to fill inadvertent gaps in the focused language of (c)(1). One way to discern the reach of an “otherwise” clause is to look for guidance from whatever examples come before it. Two general princi- ples are relevant. First, the canon of noscitur a sociis