Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

CULLEY ET AL. v. MARSHALL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALABAMA, ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–585. Argued October 30, 2023—Decided May 9, 2024 Petitioner Halima Culley loaned her car to her son, who was later pulled over by Alabama police officers and arrested for possession of marijuana. Petitioner Lena Sutton loaned her car to a friend, who was stopped by Alabama police and arrested for trafficking methamphetamine. In both cases, petitioners’ cars were seized under an Alabama civil forfeiture law that permitted seizure of a car “inci- dent to an arrest” so long as the State then “promptly” initiated a for- feiture case. Ala. Code §20–2–93(b)(1), (c). The State of Alabama filed forfeiture complaints against Culley’s and Sutton’s cars just 10 and 13 days, respectively, after their seizure. While their forfeiture proceed- ings were pending, Culley and Sutton each filed purported class-action complaints in federal court seeking money damages under 42 U. S. C. §1983, claiming that state officials violated their due process rights by retaining their cars during the forfeiture process without holding pre- liminary hearings. In a consolidated appeal, the Eleventh Circuit af- firmed the dismissal of petitioners’ claims, holding that a timely forfei- ture hearing affords claimants due process and that no separate preliminary hearing is constitutionally required. Held: In civil forfeiture cases involving personal property, the Due Pro- cess Clause requires a timely forfeiture hearing but does not require a separate preliminary hearing. Pp. 5–14. (a) Due process ordinarily requires States to provide notice and a hearing before seizing real property. But States may immediately seize personal property subject to civil forfeiture when the property (for example, a car) otherwise could be removed, destroyed, or con- cealed before a forfeiture hearing. When a State seizes personal prop- erty, due process requires a timely post-seizure forfeiture hearing. See 2 CULLEY v. MARSHALL

Syllabus

United States v. Von Neumann, 474 U. S. 242, 249–250; United States v. $8,850, 461 U. S. 555, 562–565. The Court’s decisions in $8,850 and Von Neumann make crystal clear that due process does not require a separate preliminary hearing to determine whether seized personal property may be retained pending the ultimate forfeiture hearing. In $8,850, the Court ad- dressed the process due when the Customs Service seized currency from an individual entering the United States but did not immediately file for civil forfeiture of the currency. The Court concluded that a post- seizure delay “may become so prolonged that the dispossessed property owner has been deprived of a meaningful hearing at a meaningful time,” 461 U. S., at 562–563, and prescribed factors for courts to con- sider in assessing whether a forfeiture hearing is timely. Id., at 564– 565. In Von Neumann, a property owner failed to declare the purchase of his new car upon driving it into the United States, and a customs official seized the car after determining that it was subject to civil for- feiture. The plaintiff filed a petition for remission of the forfeiture—in essence, a request under federal law that t