Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MCINTOSH v. UNITED STATES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 22–7386. Argued February 27, 2024—Decided April 17, 2024 Petitioner Louis McIntosh was indicted on multiple counts of Hobbs Act robbery and firearm offenses. The indictment set forth the demand that McIntosh “shall forfeit . . . all property . . . derived from proceeds traceable to the commission of the [Hobbs Act] offenses.” The Govern- ment also later provided McIntosh with a pretrial bill of particulars that included as property subject to forfeiture $75,000 in cash and a BMW that McIntosh purchased just five days after one of the rob- beries. After a jury convicted McIntosh, the District Court imposed a forfeiture of $75,000 and the BMW at the sentencing hearing. Alt- hough the District Court also ordered the Government to submit an order of forfeiture for the court’s signature within a week from the hearing, the Government failed to do so. On appeal, the Government moved for a limited remand to supplement the record with a written order of forfeiture. The Second Circuit granted the unopposed motion. Back in District Court, McIntosh argued that the failure to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(2)(B)—which pro- vides that “[u]nless doing so is impractical,” a federal district court “must enter the preliminary order [of forfeiture] sufficiently in advance of sentencing to allow the parties to suggest revisions or modifications before the order becomes final as to the defendant”—meant that the District Court could not proceed with forfeiture at all. The District Court overruled McIntosh’s objections, finding that the Rule is a time- related directive, and that the failure to enter a preliminary order of forfeiture before sentencing did not prevent the court from ordering forfeiture because the missed deadline did not prejudice McIntosh. The Second Circuit affirmed in relevant part. Held: A district court’s failure to comply with Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B)’s re- quirement to enter a preliminary order before sentencing does not bar 2 MCINTOSH v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus

a judge from ordering forfeiture at sentencing subject to harmless-er- ror principles on appellate review. Pp. 5–14. (a) Although the District Court did not comply with Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B) when it failed to enter a preliminary order of forfeiture before McIntosh’s initial sentencing, the District Court retained its power to order forfeiture against McIntosh. Pp. 5–11. (1) This Court has identified three types of time limits: (i) juris- dictional deadlines; (ii) mandatory claim-processing rules, and (iii) time-related directives. See Dolan v. United States, 560 U. S. 605, 610–611. McIntosh claims that Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B) is a claim-pro- cessing rule—a mandatory deadline that regulates the timing of mo- tions or claims before the court and that, unlike jurisdictional dead- lines, is subject to waiver and forfeiture by the litigant. Id., at 610. The Government, on the other hand, argues that Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B) is a flexible time-related directive—a deadline that seeks speed by direct- ing a public official to act by a certain time and that, if missed, does not deprive the official of “the power to take the action to