Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MULDROW v. CITY OF ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–193. Argued December 6, 2023—Decided April 17, 2024 Sergeant Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow maintains that her employer, the St. Louis Police Department, transferred her from one job to another because she is a woman. From 2008 through 2017, Muldrow worked as a plainclothes officer in the Department’s specialized Intelligence Division. In 2017, the new Intelligence Division commander asked to transfer Muldrow out of the unit so he could replace her with a male police officer. Against Muldrow’s wishes, the Department approved the request and reassigned Muldrow to a uniformed job elsewhere in the Department. While Muldrow’s rank and pay remained the same in the new position, her responsibilities, perks, and schedule did not. After the transfer, Muldrow no longer worked with high-ranking offi- cials on the departmental priorities lodged in the Intelligence Division, instead supervising the day-to-day activities of neighborhood patrol of- ficers. She also lost access to an unmarked take-home vehicle and had a less regular schedule involving weekend shifts. Muldrow brought this Title VII suit to challenge the transfer. She alleged that the City, in ousting her from the Intelligence Division, had “discriminate[d] against” her based on sex “with respect to” the “terms [or] conditions” of her employment. 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(a)(1). The District Court granted the City summary judgment. The Eighth Cir- cuit affirmed, holding that Muldrow had to—but could not—show that the transfer caused her a “materially significant disadvantage.” 30 F. 4th 680, 688. Muldrow’s lawsuit could not proceed, the court said, be- cause the transfer “did not result in a diminution to her title, salary, or benefits” and had caused “only minor changes in working condi- tions.” Held: An employee challenging a job transfer under Title VII must show 2 MULDROW v. ST. LOUIS

Syllabus

that the transfer brought about some harm with respect to an identi- fiable term or condition of employment, but that harm need not be sig- nificant. Pp. 5–11. (a) Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi- tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex.” §2000e–2(a)(1). Both parties agree that Muldrow’s transfer im- plicated “terms” and “conditions” of Muldrow’s employment. The ap- plicable statutory language thus prohibits “discriminat[ing] against” an individual “with respect to” the “terms [or] conditions” of employ- ment because of that individual’s sex. That language requires Muldrow to show that her transfer brought about some “disadvantageous” change in an employment term or con- dition. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 80. The words “discriminate against,” the Court has explained, refer to “differences in treatment that injure” employees. Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U. S. 644, 681. In the typical transfer case, that worse treatment must be “with respect to” employment “terms [or] condi- tions.” §2000e–2(