Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

SHEETZ v. COUNTY OF EL DORADO, CALIFORNIA

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

No. 22–1074. Argued January 9, 2024—Decided April 12, 2024 As a condition of receiving a residential building permit, petitioner George Sheetz was required by the County of El Dorado to pay a $23,420 traffic impact fee. The fee was part of a “General Plan” en- acted by the County’s Board of Supervisors to address increasing de- mand for public services spurred by new development. The fee amount was not based on the costs of traffic impacts specifically attributable to Sheetz’s particular project, but rather was assessed according to a rate schedule that took into account the type of development and its location within the County. Sheetz paid the fee under protest and ob- tained the permit. He later sought relief in state court, claiming that conditioning the building permit on the payment of a traffic impact fee constituted an unlawful “exaction” of money in violation of the Takings Clause. In Sheetz’s view, the Court’s decisions in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U. S. 825, and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U. S. 374, required the County to make an individualized determination that the fee imposed on him was necessary to offset traffic congestion attributable to his project. The courts below ruled against Sheetz based on their view that Nollan and Dolan apply only to permit condi- tions imposed on an ad hoc basis by administrators, not to a fee like this one imposed on a class of property owners by Board-enacted leg- islation. 84 Cal. App. 5th 394, 402, 300 Cal. Rptr. 3d 308, 312. Held: The Takings Clause does not distinguish between legislative and administrative land-use permit conditions. Pp. 4–11. (a) When the government wants to take private property for a pub- lic purpose, the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause requires the gov- ernment to provide the owner “just compensation.” The Takings Clause saves individual property owners from bearing “public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 2 SHEETZ v. COUNTY OF EL DORADO

Syllabus

whole.” Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49. Even so, the States have substantial authority to regulate land use, see Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, and a State law that merely restricts land use in a way “reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government purpose” is not a taking unless it saps too much of the property’s value or frustrates the owner’s investment- backed expectations. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 123, 127. Similarly, when the government can deny a build- ing permit to further a “legitimate police-power purpose,” it can also place conditions on the permit that serve the same end. Nollan, 483 U. S., at 836. For example, if a proposed development will “substan- tially increase traffic congestion,” the government may condition the building permit on the owner’s willingness “to deed over the land needed to widen a public road.” Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Man- agement Dist., 570 U. S. 595, 605. But when the government with- holds or conditions a building permit for reasons unrelated to its legit- imate land-use interests