Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MCELRATH v. GEORGIA

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

No. 22–721. Argued November 28, 2023—Decided February 21, 2024 After petitioner Damian McElrath killed his mother, the State of Georgia charged him with three crimes related to her death: malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. At trial, the jury returned a split verdict against McElrath: “not guilty by reason of insanity” with respect to malice-murder, and “guilty but mentally ill” as to the other counts. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia determined that the jury’s “guilty but mentally ill” verdict for felony murder was “repug- nant” to the jury’s “not guilty by reason of insanity” verdict for malice murder under Georgia law, because the verdicts “required affirmative findings of different mental states that could not exist at the same time.” See 308 Ga. 104, 112, 839 S. E. 2d 573, 579. The court vacated both the malice-murder and felony-murder verdicts pursuant to Geor- gia’s so-called repugnancy doctrine, and authorized retrial. Ibid., 839 S. E. 2d, at 580. On remand, McElrath argued that the Double Jeop- ardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibited Georgia from retrying him for malice murder given the jury’s prior “not guilty by reason of insanity” verdict on that charge. The Georgia courts rejected that ar- gument. Held: The jury’s verdict that McElrath was not guilty of malice murder by reason of insanity constituted an acquittal for double jeopardy pur- poses notwithstanding any inconsistency with the jury’s other verdicts. Pp. 5–10. (a) The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 5. “[I]t has long been settled under the Fifth Amendment that a verdict of acquittal is final, ending a defendant’s jeopardy, and . . . is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offence.” Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 188 (internal quotation 2 MCELRATH v. GEORGIA

Syllabus

marks omitted). The Court’s “cases have defined an acquittal to en- compass any ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to estab- lish criminal liability for an offense.” Evans v. Michigan, 568 U. S. 313, 318. Once rendered, a jury’s verdict of acquittal is inviolate. The principle “that ‘[a] verdict of acquittal . . . could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise,’ ” is “[p]erhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence.” United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564, 571. Whatever the basis for a jury’s verdict, see Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 580 U. S. 5, 10, the Dou- ble Jeopardy Clause prohibits second-guessing the reason for a jury’s acquittal. Pp. 5–7. (b) Georgia law specifically provides that a defendant who estab- lishes an insanity defense “shall not be found guilty of [the] crime.” Ga. Code Ann. §§16–3–2, 16–3–3. Here, the jury concluded that McElrath was not guilty by reason of insanity with respect to the malice-murder charge. That verdict was unquestionably a “ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense,” Evans, 568 U. S., at 318, and thus an acquittal. Georgia argues that there was n