Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL DEVELOPMENT RURAL HOUSING SERVICE v. KIRTZ CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 22–846. Argued November 6, 2023—Decided February 8, 2024 The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, as amended by the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996, allows consumers to sue lenders who willfully or negligently supply false information about them to en- tities that generate credit reports. Respondent Reginald Kirtz secured a loan from a division of the United States Department of Agriculture and later sued the agency for money damages under the FCRA. Kirtz alleged that the USDA falsely told TransUnion—a credit reporting agency—that his account was past due, thus damaging his credit score and his ability to secure loans at affordable rates. The USDA moved to dismiss, invoking sovereign immunity. The District Court sided with the USDA. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that 15 U. S. C. §§1681n and 1681o authorize suits for damages against “any person” who violates the FCRA, and §1681a expressly defines “person” to in- clude “any” government agency. 46 F. 4th 159, 164–166. Held: A consumer may sue a federal agency for defying the FCRA’s terms. Pp. 4–20. (a) As a sovereign, the United States is generally immune from suits seeking money damages unless Congress chooses to waive that im- munity. See, e.g., United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 399. To de- termine whether Congress has chosen to do so, this Court applies a “clear statement” rule, permitting suit against the government only when “the language of the statute” is “unmistakably clear” in allowing it. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 73. Guided by these principles, this Court has found a clear waiver of sovereign immunity “in only two situations.” Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for P. R. v. Centro De Periodismo Investigativo, Inc., 2 DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL DEVELOPMENT RURAL HOUSING SERV. v. KIRTZ Syllabus

598 U. S. 339, 347. “The first is when a statute says . . . that it is strip- ping immunity from a sovereign entity.” Ibid. The second “is when a statute creates a cause of action” and explicitly “authorizes suit against a government on that claim.” Ibid. Statutes in the second category may not directly address sovereign immunity, but dismissing a claim against the government would negate a claim specifically au- thorized by Congress. Id., at 348; see Kimel, 528 U. S. 62. Applying these principles leads to the conclusion that the FCRA clearly waives sovereign immunity in cases like this one. The FCRA’s requirements apply to “person[s]” who, like the federal government here, furnish information to consumer reporting agencies. §1681s– 2(b). Sections 1681n and 1681o create a cause of action for money damages to consumers injured by “[a]ny person” who willfully or neg- ligently fails to comply with the statute’s directive. Section 1681a pro- vides a definition of “person” that includes “any . . . government . . . agency,” §1681a(b), and that applies to the entire Act. That other stat- utory provisions in the FCRA and elsewhere address the question of sovereign immunity in arguably more obvious terms, see, e.g., §1681u, does not make the waiver of sovereign immunity in the pr