Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

THORNELL, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v. JONES CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 22–982. Argued April 17, 2024—Decided May 30, 2024 Respondent Danny Lee Jones was convicted of the premeditated first- degree murders of Robert and Tisha Weaver and the attempted pre- meditated murder of Robert’s grandmother Katherine Gumina. Ari- zona law at the time required the trial court to “impose a sentence of death” if it found “one or more” statutorily enumerated “aggravating circumstances” and “no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substan- tial to call for leniency.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13–703(E). The trial court found three aggravating circumstances that applied to both Rob- ert’s and Tisha’s murders: Jones committed multiple homicides, §13– 703(F)(8); he was motivated by “pecuniary” gain, §13–703(F)(5); and the murders were “especially heinous, cruel or depraved,” §13– 703(F)(6). The trial court found an additional aggravating circum- stance with respect to Tisha’s murder: she was a young child, §13– 703(F)(9). The trial court also concluded that Jones had established four mitigating circumstances: long-term substance abuse, drug and alcohol impairment at the time of the murders, head trauma, and childhood abuse. 9 Record 2465. The court concluded that these miti- gating circumstances were “not sufficiently substantial to outweigh the aggravating circumstances,” so it sentenced Jones to death. Ibid. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed after “review[ing] the entire rec- ord” and “independently weighing all of the aggravating and mitigat- ing evidence presented.” 185 Ariz. 471, 492, 917 P. 2d 200, 221. Jones later sought state postconviction review on the theory that de- fense counsel was ineffective, but the Arizona courts rejected Jones’s claims. Jones next filed a federal habeas petition in District Court and reasserted his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing but ultimately concluded that Jones 2 THORNELL v. JONES

Syllabus

could not show prejudice because the additional information he pre- sented “ ‘barely. . . alter[ed] the sentencing profile presented to the sen- tencing judge.’ ” Jones v. Schriro, 450 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1043 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 700). The Ninth Circuit re- versed, but this Court vacated that judgment and remanded for the Ninth Circuit to determine whether, in light of Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. 170, it had been proper to consider the new evidence pre- sented at the federal evidentiary hearing. See Ryan v. Jones, 563 U. S. 932. On reconsideration, the Ninth Circuit again granted habeas re- lief. The panel held that it was permissible to consider the new evi- dence and concluded that there was a “ ‘reasonable probability’ ” that “Jones would not have received a death sentence” if that evidence had been presented at sentencing. Jones v. Ryan, 52 F. 4th 1104, 1137. Ten judges dissented from the denial of en banc review. One dissent, joined by eight judges, asserted that the Ninth Circuit panel flouted Strickland by crediting “questionable, weak, and cumulative mitiga- tion evidence” as “enough to overcome . . . weight[y] .