Volume 598 U. S. Part 1 Pages 115–141

OFFICIAL REPORTS OF

THE SUPREME COURT February 28, 2023

Page Proof Pending Publication

REBECCA A. WOMELDORF reporter of decisions

NOTICE: This preliminary print is subject to formal revision before the bound volume is published. Users are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors. OCTOBER TERM, 2022 115

Syllabus

DELAWARE v. PENNSYLVANIA et al.

on exceptions to reports of special master No. 145, Orig. Argued October 3, 2022—Decided February 28, 2023* A State may take custody of abandoned property located within its bor- ders; this process is commonly known as “escheatment.” When aban- doned property is intangible, however, the lack of a physical location means that multiple States may have arguable claims. In these cases, the question is which States have the right to escheat two fnancial products sold by banks on behalf of MoneyGram: Agent Checks and Teller's Checks (collectively, Disputed Instruments). Operating much like money orders, both products are prepaid fnancial instruments used to transfer funds to a named payee. When these prepaid instruments are not presented for payment within a certain period of time, they are deemed abandoned, and, currently, MoneyGram applies the common-law escheatment practices outlined in Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U. S. 674. There the Court established the rule that the proceeds of abandoned fnancial products should escheat to the State of the creditor's last Page Proof Pending Publication known address, id., at 680–681, or where such records are not kept, to the State in which the company holding the funds is incorporated, id., at 682. Because MoneyGram does not, as a matter of regular business practice, keep records of creditor addresses for the two products at issue in these cases, it applies the secondary common-law rule and transmits the abandoned proceeds to its State of incorporation, i. e., Delaware. Multiple States invoked this Court's original jurisdiction to determine whether the abandoned proceeds of the Disputed Instruments are gov- erned by the Disposition of Abandoned Money Orders and Traveler's Checks Act (Federal Disposition Act or FDA) rather than the common law. The FDA provides that “a money order . . . or other similar writ- ten instrument (other than a third party bank check)” should generally escheat to “the State in which such . . . instrument was purchased.” 12 U. S. C. § 2503. This Court consolidated the actions and appointed a Special Master. In his initial report, the Special Master concluded that the Disputed Instruments were covered by the FDA. Following oral argument in this Court, he reassessed that decision and issued a second report, concluding that many of the Disputed Instruments were or could

*Together with No. 146, Orig., Arkansas et al. v. Delaware, also on exceptions to reports of Special Master. 116 DELAWARE v. PENNSYLVANIA

Syllabus

be “third party bank check[s],” which are excluded from the FDA and would generally escheat to Delaware under the circumstances. Held: The Disputed Instruments are suffciently “similar” to a money order to fall within the FDA. Pp. 127–141. (a) The parties disagree whether the Disputed Instruments qualify as “money order[s]” or “other similar written instrument[s] (other than a third party bank check)” under § 2503. Because a fnding that the Disputed Instruments are similar to money orders would be suffcient to bring the Disputed Instruments within § 2503'